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How Television Transformed the Meech Lake Negotiations
**** TARAS *************** EJC/REC Vol. 1, No. 2, 1991 ***


HOW TELEVISION TRANSFORMED THE MEECH LAKE NEGOTIATIONS


David Taras
University of Calgary


        Abstract.  Television coverage of the Meech
     Lake constitutional negotiations influenced the
     final outcome in two ways: First, by playing an
     agenda setting role, and second by providing a
     platform for negotiations among the first
     ministers.  Despite saturation coverage of Meech,
     an astonishing illiteracy prevailed amongst the
     general public, owing to the limitations of the
     "infotainment" format.  Journalists actually
     participated in the negotiating process, by
     delivering new information to the negotiators,
     through their privileged access.  Journalists also
     forced events, by pressing participants to comment
     on the latest events, sometimes before they had
     time to think.  The widespread publicity given to
     positions taken meant the first ministers could
     not change or modify their stances, without
     appearing to betray their principles.  Thus, TV
     news not only reports on negotiations, but it has
     become a part of them, altering them in the
     process.

        COMMENT LA TELEVISION A INFLUENCE LES
     NEGOCIATIONS DU LAC MEECH.  La couverture
     televisuelle des negociations du Lac Meech a
     influence le resultat final de deux facons:
     premierement, en jouant un role d' "agenda
     setting" et, deuxiemement, en fournissant une
     scene sur laquelle les premiers ministres
     negociaient.  En depit de la forte couverture du
     Lac Meech, une ignorance etonnante prevalait dans
     le public a cause des limites de l'information sur
     le mode du divertissement.  Les journalistes, par
     leur acces previlegie au processus, prirent une
     part active dans les negociations en fournissant
     de nouvelles informations aux negociateurs.  Les
     journalistes ont aussi precipite les evenements en
     insistant aupres des participants afin que ces
     derniers commentent les evenements, quelques fois
     avant meme que ceux-ci aient eu le temps d'y
     reflechir.  Suite a la large diffusion de leurs
     positions initiales, les premiers ministres ne
     pouvaient changer leurs positions sans avoir l'air
     de renier leurs principes.  Par consequent, les
     nouvelles televisees ne font pas que rapporter les
     negociations, mais elles en sont une partie
     integrante et elles en influencent le processus.


     One can argue that there were two ways in which
television coverage of the Meech Lake constitutional
negotiations influenced the final outcome.  First,
television coverage was likely to have played an
agenda-setting role; certifying which issues and events
were seen as important by the public and which were not.
Well aware of the singular power of television to convey
moods and impressions to a vast audience, if not
information and analysis, the First Ministers missed few
opportunities to appear on television with their messages
and versions of events.  Media managers and senior
journalists acted as "gatekeepers" deciding which aspects
of the unfolding Meech Lake drama would become leading
news stories, the context in which the stories would be
presented, and the stories' slant or spin.
     Second, television seemed to become another platform
for negotiations among the First Ministers.  The first
platform, of course, were the actual face to face
negotiations involving the Prime Minister and the
Premiers; a process that had acknowledged procedures and
well defined structures, symbols, and etiquette and
includes an elaborate "backchannel" of visits and
emissaries, making side deals and forming coalitions.
Less is known, however, about the  rituals and routines
that surround the "negotiations" that occurred on
television.  When First Ministers were asked to respond
instantly to the positions or comments of other First
Ministers, talked to each other directly while seeing
each other only on television monitors, and presented and
reacted  to new proposals or information communicated to
each other for the first time through journalists, a kind
of negotiating process was, in fact, underway.  Indeed,
Mark Starowicz, the executive producer of CBC's The
Journal, once described his program as "part of the
system.  It is the method by which with Parliament a
national consensus is obtained.  We are the perpetual
emergency debate."1  While great attention is now being
paid to reforming the formal structures of power, there
seems to be little concern about what A. W. Johnson has
called the "parallel government" which includes the
enormous power of the mass media.2

Television and Agenda-Setting

     A vigourous scholarly debate has been underway for
some time about the effects television coverage has on
the formation of public attitudes.  Most researchers
would agree with the conclusions reached by Bernard Cohen
in his influential study on press reporting conducted in
the 1960s: "The press is significantly more than a
purveyor of information and opinion.  It may not be
successful much of the time in telling people what to
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its
readers what to think about".3  Maxwell McCombs and
Donald Shaw first coined the term "agenda-setting" to
describe the power of the mass media to influence voters'
perceptions about which issues were important.4  Their
studies, carried out during the 1968 and 1972 U.S.
presidential elections, found a correlation between the
issues that were covered extensively on television news
and in the press and the attitudes that voters had about
which issues they considered important.  A more recent
study on the impact of television goes even further.
Iyengar and Kinder concluded that "television is now an
authority virtually without peer", with the capacity to
"prime" viewers by setting "the terms by which political
judgements are rendered and political choices made".5
The key to television's power is its ability to convey
an impression of almost impregnable authority.  Viewers
have the feeling that they are witnesses, that they are
seeing things for themselves.  Viewers trust what they
see.  Moreover, television news is encased in trappings
of authority.  Iyengar and Kinder quote P. H. Weaver's
description of the role played by the TV reporter who
"towers" over issues and events and speaks
"authoritatively and self-confidently about everything
that comes into his (sic) field of vision: men, (sic)
events, motives, intentions, meanings, significances,
trends, threats, problems, solutions - all are evidently
within his (sic) perfect understanding, and he (sic)
pronounces on them without any ifs, and, or buts".6  As
Todd Gitlin has described the influence of television
journalists, "They name the world's parts, they certify
reality as reality."7
     Paradoxically, the scholarly literature also
suggests that while television may have the power to
reorder the perceptions and priorities of its viewers,
audiences actually learn very little about the issues
that are reported.  The accepted wisdom is that TV is far
better at conveying drama and emotions than it is in
presenting facts and information.  Indeed, some scholars
have gone as far as to argue that television news is so
thin, so focused on visuals,  personalities and
entertainment that it fails entirely as a vehicle for
educating the public.  For instance, Patterson and
McClure were able to claim in their study of television
coverage during the 1976 U.S. presidential election that
"since the nightly news is too brief to treat fully the
complexity of modern politics, too visual to present
effectively most events, and too entertainment-minded to
tell viewers much worth knowing, most network newscasts
are neither very educational nor very powerful
communicators."8  A study published in 1990 by John
Robinson and Dennis Davis suggests that while viewers may
believe that they are getting most of their information
from television, in actual fact, newspapers and
conversations are far more effective in transmitting
information.9  Their conclusion is that television is
primarily an entertainment medium which while conveying
vast amounts of visual material-that shocks and
sensationalizes, stimulates and passifies, does not
normally produce anything beyond superficial learning.
     A Globe and Mail-CBC News poll taken after the
collapse of the Meech Lake agreement found that a
majority of respondents knew "nothing at all" or "not
very much" about the accord.10  An astonishing illiteracy
about constitutional issues prevailed despite saturation
television coverage; during a one week period at the
height of the final round of negotiations, the week of
4-10 June,  CBC produced 882 minutes of live coverage
excluding the time allotted for The National and The
Journal preempting regularly scheduled programs 20 times.
CTV  produced 528 minutes of coverage during that same
decisive week.11  Each of the major networks made a
decision to forego substantial advertising revenue and
dug deep into their budgets to pay overtime, use extra
equipment and follow the Meech Lake drama as it unfolded
often in several locations at once across the country.
At one point CBC television had as many as 14 or 15
reporters assigned to the story.12
     The national news programs had a sizable audience
reach.  CBC's The National registered an average audience
of 1,189,000 during the week of 4-10 June, while The CTV
National News was watched by an average of 759,000
viewers.  Radio Canada's Telejournal reached an average
audience of 841,000 during May and June.13  It is also
interesting to note that television is the exclusive
source of news for 28 per cent of adults aged 25-49.14
     Knowing little about the contents of the accord,
however, did not prevent people from having views.  In
Quebec opinion seemed to harden as Meech Lake became a
symbol of Quebec's need for recognition and identity.
The accord became a touchstone for the deepest
sentiments, for arousing the most naked passions.  One
is left to conclude that with its sizeable audience reach
(although just 2.8 million in a country of 26 million)
and authoritative power, television helped set the public
agenda although it failed to educate much of the public
in any meaningful way.
     This lack of knowledge cannot be dismissed as
peculiar to Meech Lake; the complexity of the Meech Lake
conundrum overwhelming the capacities of average
citizens.  Canadians know surprisingly little about most
national institutions and issues.15
     The educational failure stems from the very nature
of television news.  In a study of CBC television's
coverage of the making of the Meech Lake deal as it
unfolded during the period from late April to early June
1987, I argued that reporting was limited and distorted
by the television news "frame"; a system of reporting as
much by the need to entertain as to inform.16  According
to Todd Gitlin "Frames are principles of selection,
emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit
theories about what exists, what happens and what
matters."17  Although Gitlin claims that the frame is
based on ideological assumptions designed to promote
established interests, the frame is also tailored to
appeal to what media managers perceive to be audience
tastes and to the routines and imperatives of news
organizations.  The frame is "clamped" over the event
being covered highlighting some aspects of the story and
downplaying or ignoring others.  Scholars differ over
what constitutes the frame, with some scholars using
other terms to describe the same phenomenon  and each
proposing their own definitions. I used only the most
obvious criteria.
     1.  News takes place in the "continuous present
tense" and is concerned with what is happening in the
here and now.  It is ahistorical to the extent that
little historical context can be provided.
     2.  News stories need conflict.  In order to enhance
the drama that is required to make stories exiting and
appealing, television news celebrates stories that
involve clashes between two distinct groups or positions,
have clear winners and losers and have an emotional human
element.  Stories that don't feature sharp conflict are
unlikely to remain news stories for long.
     3.  Limited by time and budgetary constraints, the
news "net" rarely reaches beyond reporting a restricted
number of people and locations.  Reporters tend to be
placed at strategic "listening posts" such as on
Parliament Hill so that party leaders, cabinet ministers
and MPs tend to dominate the news.  The activities or
reactions of business or labour,  or regional or ethnic
interest groups,  those beyond the immediate news net,
are almost never covered to the same extent.
     4.  Television news thrives on personalities.
Individuals come to symbolize entire issues or events.
News analysis is almost always a discussion about the
motivations, desires, emotions and strategies of
individuals.  The focus is usually on leaders in triumph,
leaders in conflict or leaders in trouble.  Larger
political, societal or economic forces are hardly ever
touched upon.
     5.  Stories must be easily labelled and condensed.
The average news story is roughly 90 seconds long and
amounts to no more than 150 to 250 words.  The average
length of a "clip" of someone being interviewed is 12
seconds.  Issues that require complex explanations or
extensive background information or are tedious and
legalistic are either ignored or brutally condensed.
     6.  Television is a visual medium.  The best stories
for television journalists are ones that contain exciting
visual material; shouting matches in the House of
Commons, angry demonstrations, natural or person made
disasters and dramatic backdrops.  Stories that don't
have exciting visuals are unlikely to receive extensive
coverage and may be ignored entirely.
     My study concluded that, operating within the limits
of an infotainment format, The National's coverage was
highly condensed and truncated, focused on conflict, was
obsessed with personalities and conveyed little actual
information about what was in the accord. The Meech Lake
Accord was presented as if it suddenly had sprung out of
nowhere, as if there had been no prior history of
constitution making.  Reporting was so abbreviated that
out of Quebec's five demands only one was mentioned on
the news.  The most complete description of the
agreement's provisions was offered by David Halton in the
following manner:

     Constitutional experts were also mulling over
     the first ministers' agreement yesterday which
     not only recognizes Quebec as a distinct
     society, but also gives all provinces
     increased powers.  Those powers give the
     premiers a veto over changes to some federal
     institutions, and a big say in Supreme Court
     and Senate appointments.18

     Well over one-third of the news stories dealt with
splits within the Liberal party and controversy over how
the party's turmoil over the accord would affect John
Turner's leadership.  The consequences that the accord
might have for Canadian identity, on how the country
would be governed and on the evolution of Quebec
nationalism were not discussed or referred to in any
way.  In short, The National's news format, its
adherence to the frame, did not allow it to educate its
viewers in any meaningful way.
     Troubled by criticism that they had not explained
the accord adequately, senior CBC journalists attempted
a series of innovations.  In winter 1990 The National
ran a series of special segments; five minute reports on
a different aspect of the accord for four consecutive
nights.  Charts and graphics were used to explain the
main points in the accord and the issues that had caused
so much controversy.  Whenever there were new
developments, The National would "prime" its viewers by
again explaining the significance of the accord.  In
addition, The National and The Journal combined to
produce a two hour documentary that took a gloomy
panoramic look at the strains caused by the Meech Lake
drama.
     The Journal also produced two shows entitled "In
Search of Ourselves".  Both programs had a haunting
foreboding quality.  Rick Salutin has described the
atmosphere created by the producers: "Guests were shot
against darkness, with perhaps a single source of light.
The many bridging shots were haunting landscapes of a
stagnant river, a wave-beaten coast, a lonely
lighthouse, a city in fog, all photographed through
filters to give the impression of perpetual twilight,
plus repeated images of Canadians walking slow motion,
perplexed and ghostly, through their cities' streets."19
Brian Stewart, the host, intoned mournfully about a
country immobilized by doubt, bitterness and despair.20
     Yet these attempts to move beyond the frame proved
frustrating and futile.  As CBC correspondent and
national anchor Peter Mansbridge has described the
problem:

     It wasn't our stories, our reporters, or our
     presentations.  I think they were all first
     rate.  It was our medium television... Here's
     where print has the edge over television.
     When you pick up a newspaper and read about
     Meech Lake, you can read a complicated
     constitutional story over and over until it
     makes sense.  With television news, you've got
     just one shot. If the explanation isn't clear,
     we've lost you.  That's what our research
     seems to indicate happened when we ran our
     series on Meech Lake.  We tried, but it didn't
     seem to work.21

One can also argue that the problem was not with the
limitations of the medium but with constraints imposed
by the current format of television news.  Education
often requires frequent repetition, something that goes
against the grain of the television news format.  It
also needs more words and ideas than are available in a
90 second news report.  In addition, newscasts tend to
be highly fragmented and disjointed as news shows, in
order to maintain a fast exciting pace, move
breathlessly from one story to another.  Stories flitter
by one after another, engendering, some scholars
contend, a sense of distracted passivity in viewers.
One can also argue that audiences are conditioned to see
television as primarily an entertainment vehicle and are
psychologically unprepared when watching TV to make the
effort that real learning requires.  What is presented
to and received by the viewers in the end, are the
"coronas" of issues and events, their glow, rather than
their substance.
     News coverage of the Meech Lake negotiations
produced another educational problem.  Focus group
testing conducted by the CBC in spring 1990 revealed
that viewers were beginning to tire of the issue.  They
saw it as the concern of an elite group and were losing
interest in what seemed to be an endless series of
threats, manoeuvres and squabbles.  Audience interest
had to some degree evaporated by the time the networks
launched their last intensive rounds of coverage.  The
sentiment was captured in a cartoon that appeared in The
Globe and Mail which showed a nurse presiding over the
Meech Lake Accord Overexposure Trauma Centre.  She was
issuing a warning: "Attention all units, CBC's just run
another in-depth analysis."22
     Some scholars would argue that viewer boredom is
the inevitable by-product of "jolts" television.23  As
audiences are constantly bombarded by sudden bursts of
action on dramatic shows, powerful visuals, an endless
kaleidoscope of new fresh faces, and a widening array of
channels at their fingertips, tolerance for the "old"
and mundane is at a low threshold. Studies conducted in
the U.S. have found that more than half of those under
34 years of age routinely watch at least two programs at
the same time.24 Even popular shows have relatively
short lifespans. And Meech Lake was hardly a hit series.
     But television is much more than fluff and puff.
Television is, as described before, an immensely
powerful medium that undoubtedly played a role in
influencing the Meech Lake negotiations, if not in
educating the audience! Of course, television news did
not create the agenda; the Prime Minister and the
Premiers, senior civil servants, political parties and
interest groups all had the capacity to "build" the
agenda.  Media gatekeepers, however, had and have the
power to decide the issues and perspectives that are the
most newsworthy, whether new developments will be
portrayed in a positive or negative light and to declare
"winners" and "losers".  As Edwin Black has put it, "The
new reality for federalist politics in Canada can be
stated simply: so far as the voters are concerned, if
it's not on TV, it doesn't exist."25
     One can argue that there were at least three
instances in which television news reporting influenced
the shape of the negotiations.  The first was when Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney asserted that failure to ratify
the accord could lead to Quebec's separation.  A steady
stream of statements from Mulroney and by cabinet
ministers predicted dire consequences and even a return
of FLQ style terrorism.  The strategy in raising the
stakes, in heating up the political temperature, was to
pressure the accord's opponents into relenting by making
their objections to the Meech Lake agreement seem narrow
and self-indulgent.  Some would contend, however, that
in setting this tone for the negotiations Mulroney
created a self-fulfilling prophecy.  By putting the
issue in such stark terms, and by making the
"acceptance" of Quebec the main issue, Mulroney
contributed to the unleashing of nationalist sentiment
in Quebec.
     By reporting these ominous forecasts as a way of
hyping the Meech Lake story and without pointing out the
larger strategy that lay behind these statements,
journalists helped produce the harsh climate that
surrounded and ultimately consumed the negotiations.
What is significant in this case is that journalists
seemed to abrogate accepted standards of media
responsibility.  During elections, for instance,
journalists feel that analyzing the election strategies
of the parties, unmasking the pretensions of party
leaders, and exposing the hollowness of political
promises or policies is almost a sacred obligation.  The
intentions and characters of party leaders are put under
an intense burning spotlight.  Yet these same standards
of critical observation were largely absent with regard
to many of the Prime Minister's pronouncements on Meech
Lake.  It was perhaps that Mulroney's hyperbole fit the
frame; it had the sensational elements that TV news
cherishes and requires.
     A second example of the capacity of TV news to
affect the political agenda was the swath of sensational
coverage given to the defection of Mulroney's Quebec
lieutenant Lucien Bouchard in May 1990.  Bouchard's
resignation from the cabinet came in response to a
unanimous report on how to resolve the Meech Lake
impasse by a parliamentary committee headed by Jean
Charest.   The Charest report proposed that there be a
companion resolution which would affirm the supremacy of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms while acknowledging
Quebec's role as a distinct society.  The report also
recommended that the federal government be given the
power to "promote" as well as preserve the English and
French languages, and that Senate reform, if not agreed
to within a specified period of time, could then be
implemented with less than unanimous consent.  One
cannot dispute that Bouchard's dramatic exit was an
important event that required extensive news coverage.
His departure had enormous implications for Conservative
prospects in Quebec and indeed for Mulroney personally.
It had all the elements that make for a first-rate
television news story; personalities in conflict,
charges of betrayal, raw human emotions and exciting
visuals.
     Yet Bouchard's actions were given such extensive
coverage that it allowed the Quebec MP to "hijack" the
negotiating process.  Cameras followed Bouchard's
"passion play" for days as he gave vent to his feelings
of anguish and anger.  The effect was to bury the
Charest proposals amid an avalanche of publicity.  The
dry, detailed and complex report, however crucial it
might have been in moving the negotiations forward, was
no match for the Bouchard story with its elemental human
emotion.  By not giving the Charest proposals
significant coverage, and by leaping on the Bouchard
story with such vehemence, the media probably influenced
events.  Certainly the lionization of Bouchard stirred
the fires of Quebec nationalism and Bouchard's dire
warning to Premier Bourassa that he not go to Ottawa to
negotiate because of the traps that were being laid for
him, left the premier with little room for compromise;
his back was against the wall.
     A third example of agenda-setting was the play
given on French-language television to the desecration
of the Quebec flag by English rights extremists; the
so-called Brockville incident.  A ten-second clip
showing the Quebec flag being trampled on and burned by
outraged anglophones caused a sensation in Quebec.  The
scene became a metaphor, a symbol, for many Quebecers of
English Canada's "rejection" of Quebec during the Meech
Lake negotiations.  This was a kind of "demon clip", the
Canadian equivalent of the "Willie Horton" ad shown by
Republicans during the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign;
a scene that terrifies, strikes a raw nerve, evokes a
heated emotional response.  Some observers question why
TV journalists in Quebec found it necessary to use such
explosive material and give such extraordinary coverage
to the actions of a fringe group.   The clip certainly
fit the visual agenda of TV reporting, it may have also
fit the personal biases and political agendas of some
journalists.  It may also have been a blind adherence to
the Werner Von Braun theory of journalism; as the rocket
scientist who worked for Hitler and later for the
Americans was supposed to have said, "I just make the
rockets, I don't care where they land."  Interestingly
enough when the national anthem was booed at a Montreal
Expos baseball game, an incident that was at least as
ugly as the flag desecration, it received little
attention in the English language media.  While it is
difficult to know the effects of this kind of coverage,
in a recent study Doris Graber found that on "television
seeing is believing" because when it comes to TV
"learning is shaped by the vistas gleaned by the human
eye."26

Television and Constitution-Making

     The Meech Lake negotiating process was, on one
level, private and secretive.  The actual face to face
negotiations were not televised or open to the press.
Much of the negotiations took place through a
"backchannel" of phone calls and meetings, a process
that was intimate and highly charged.  At several stages
in the negotiations a veritable constitutional shuttle
service was at work carrying officials from capital to
capital and "rolling drafts of documents" were
circulated across the country.  First ministers were
often on the phone to each other three or four times a
day.  The closed nature of the negotiations aroused
suspicion and anger among groups that believed that only
an open process would guarantee that their positions
received a fair hearing and to some degree amongst a
public that was used to watching constitutional
conferences on television.  The Meech Lake negotiating
process was the very opposite of Woodrow Wilson's call
"for open covenants openly arrived at."
     Yet the Meech Lake negotiations became, despite the
shrouds of secrecy that surrounded them, a major
television spectacle.  Television was an intrusive
partner in the negotiations.  It was at times a common
ground for exchanges among the first ministers, the
messenger that brought news of the latest developments
to the negotiators and the vehicle by which the first
ministers communicated their positions to their publics.
The television cameras could be likened to the wall in
a squash court; negotiating positions would have to be
hit against the media wall to keep them in play and to
give them legitimacy.
     There were three ways in which media coverage
played a role in the negotiations.  First, there were
instances where information was received by the
negotiators for the first time via the media.  Whether
through leaks or at press conferences and briefings,
proposals or positions were presented to journalists
before they were communicated to the other negotiating
partners.  Ottawa bureau chief for CBC television news,
Elly Alboim, has described the utility of leaking
information to journalists: "It was a way of getting
things moving around, trying to screw things up or move
things forward.  It was a way of seeing what kind of
bite there would be."27  There were a number of
instances where proposals were floated as "trial
balloons" or "road tested" to see if they were
acceptable.  For example, the proposition that the
federal government should be allowed to "promote" as
well as preserve English and French was hit against the
media squash court walls several times before it emerged
as part of the Charest proposals.  The dispute between
Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan, on one hand,
and Manitoba, on the other, over whether there would be
"sunset" or "sunrise" provisions on the issue of how to
override the unanimous consent needed to bring reform of
the Senate, led to some of the players "getting stuff
out to force people's hands."28
     In late May 1990, an Ontario government strategy
paper was leaked to Southam news.  It described a plan
to "discredit the holdout premiers" should the first
ministers conference that was about to take place fail
to break the constitutional logjam.  The strategy
advised Premier Peterson to ensure "that the blame for
failure falls squarely on the dissident provinces and
not on Quebec."29  Peterson was to "insist that Clyde
Well's concerns were 'out of proportion' and that he was
fuelling the crisis."  The media was to be discouraged
from delving too deeply into legal issues or "those
involving popular parts of the dissident's positions,
e.g. individual rights, regional development,
aboriginals, perceived lack of compromise by Quebec."
The purpose in leaking the document was obviously to
embarrass Peterson and foil the strategy.
     The secrecy that encrusted the formal negotiations
that took place during the crucial week of 3-9 June
seemed to produce feverish attempts by various
governments to get messages out to the media.  Rick
Salutin claims that the Mulroney government successfully
managed the news through leaks.  As Salutin has put it,
"The government leaked in torrents - to the Globe and
the CBC.  The phrase 'CBC news has managed to learn'
became equivalent to 'The government would like us to
say...'"30
     Of course once information is in the hands of
journalists, negotiators have little control over the
play or "spin" that a story will receive.  Stories that
have been put through the media mix-master often lose
their original thrust.  Constitutional players rely on
journalists to present their stories in a favourable
light and not downplay, dismiss or distort their
messages or plans.
     Second, there were many instances when First
Ministers found themselves in the midst of a media scrum
and pressed to comment on the latest developments
without time to think, compose themselves or consult
with colleagues and advisers.  Surrounded by journalists
who were seeking to heighten conflict, First Ministers
could, if not careful, give answers that were only
partly thought through or make off-the-cuff impromptu
remarks.  On more than a few occasions Clyde Well's
temper seemed to be on the verge of boiling over as he
reacted sharply to statements made by Brian Mulroney or
Robert Bourassa, statements conveyed to him by hovering
journalists.  Of course the politicians are often the
ones who seek out journalists, who crave the
intoxicating glow of publicity. As James Winter
elaborates in his article in this issue, in a moment of
reckless candour Mulroney told journalists from The
Globe and Mail that he had "rolled the dice" in plotting
his strategy during the last weeks of the constitutional
negotiations; words that undermined his credibility with
some of the key players.31  What is particularly
noteworthy about television is that it requires
politicians to respond.  Once in front of the cameras,
politicians must address reporters questions or risk
appearing indecisive or as if they have something to
hide.  Journalists in general but television in
particular sometimes forced events; intruded, literally
pushing their way into the process.
     Third, having staked out a constitutional position
and having that position described to millions of
viewers on television, first ministers could not change
or modify those stands without appearing to have
betrayed their principles.  Amid the glare of publicity
negotiators were locked into positions from which they
could not easily retreat.  Making matters worse, was the
tendency of some journalists to declare "winners" and
"losers", treating the negotiations as if they were a
hockey game or a boxing match, again as elaborated by
Winter in this issue.  The first ministers may have come
to believe that any substantial compromises that they
might make were likely to be portrayed as a personal
defeat.  They could read and hear the next day about how
they had been outmaneuvered or had fallen into  traps
that had been laid for them.  Face saving, an essential
element in any successful negotiation, is made
exceedingly difficult.  Small wonder that Mulroney,
Bourassa, and Wells among others came into the final
round of negotiations with backbones steeled by public
expectations; backbones that couldn't be bent.

Conclusion

     Much more research on how media reporting affects
federal-provincial and constitutional relations in
Canada needs to be conducted.  Little is now known about
how television in particular, by influencing political
agendas and intruding on to the negotiating landscape,
alters the bargaining process.  We may find that
television does not fundamentally transform or reshape
events; events galvanized for the most part by hard
traditions and history, powerful vested interests and
deeply held convictions.  We may conclude that
television coverage affects outcomes only at the
margins, style not substance.  Yet the evidence may
suggest, as I have argued, that television not only
reports on the negotiating process but has become part
of it.
     If this is the case then the power of television to
transform outcomes must be addressed in some way.
Informal groundrules might be devised so that
journalists do not exacerbate conflict by hyping and
sensationalizing disagreements.  The TV news frame might
be altered under some circumstances to accommodate a
slower pace, some degree of repetition and longer
explanations of complex issues.  The first ministers
might agree on mechanisms for dealing with the media;
perhaps a single spokesperson could be appointed to deal
with reporters questions so that the usual orgy of
threats and bravado, self-congratulations and
grandstanding could be avoided.  Ultimately there is an
educational mandate and a responsibility for caution and
self-restraint that must be exercised by both
journalists and politicians.  The alternative is to have
the mass media transform the debate according to its own
rules and requirements.  Given the destructive nature of
Canadian constitutional politics one is tempted to
paraphrase Todd Gitlin's observation about American
politics during the Vietnam War: "above the battle only
the spotlight will remain."32


                       Notes

1. Interview with Mark Starowicz, Toronto, 21 May, 1986.

2. Interview with A. W. Johnson, Ottawa, 21 August,
1990.

3. Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

4. Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The agenda-setting
function of the mass media" Public Opinion Quarterly 36
(1972): 176-187.

5. Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, News that Matters
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

6. Ibid. p. 126.

7. Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching (Berkeley:
The University of California Press, 1980) p. 2.

8. Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure, The Unseeing
Eye: The Myth of Television Power in National Elections
(New York: Putnam, 1976).

9. John Robertson and Dennis Davis, "Television News and
the Informed Public: An Information-Processing
Approach", Journal of Communication 40 (1990): 106-119.

10. "The Globe and Mail-CBC News/Poll" The Globe and
Mail, 9 July, 1990, p. A4.

11. Interview with Kara Switzer, CTV research, 18
October, 1990, (phone).

12. Interview with Elly Alboim, 26 October, 1990,
(phone).

13. Interview with Ken Leclair, CBC research, 16
October, 1990, (phone).  See also Julia Nunes, "TV news
tightens its belt", The Globe and Mail, 13 June 1990, p.
A13.

14. Canadian Facts, 1990.

15.  Particularly damning evidence about general
educational awareness can be found in Edna Einsiedel,
Scientific Literacy: A Survey of Adult Canadians, Report
Prepared for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council and Industry, Science and Technology Canada,
1990.

16. David Taras, "Television and Public Policy: The
CBC's Coverage of the Meech Lake Accord," Canadian
Public Policy p15 (1989) pp. 322-334.

17. Gitlin, p. 7.

18. Taras, p. 328.

19.  Rick Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," Saturday Night
(November 1990), p. 17.

20.  Ibid., pp. 17, 85.

21. Peter Mansbridge, "Even if it's boring, it's time to
pay attention", The Globe and Mail, 26 January 1990, p.
A7.

22. Ibid.

23. See Morris Wolfe, Jolts: The TV Wasteland and the
Canadian Oasis (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1985).

24. John Stackhouse, "Izzyvision", Report on Business
Magazine, May 1990, p.81.

25. Edwin Black, "'Going Public': Mass Communications
and Executive Federalism", David Shugarman and Reg
Whitaker eds., Federalism and Political Community:
Essays in Honour of Donald Smiley (Peterborough:
Broadview, 1989) p. 358.

26. Doris Graber, "Seeing Is Remembering: How Visuals
Contribute to Learning from Television News", Journal of
Communications 40 (1990), p. 154.

27. Interview with Elly Alboim.

28. Ibid.

29. Joan Bryden, "Plot to discredit holdouts", The
Calgary Herald, 30 May, 1990, p. A1.

30.  Salutin, p. 85.

31. "It is a tough country to govern", The Globe and
Mail, 20 June 1990, p. A21.

32. Gitlin, p. 192.

------------------------------------------------------------
David Taras is the Director of the Canadian Studies
Programme, at the University of Calgary.

                  Copyright 1991
Communication Institute for Online Scholarship, Inc.

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