The Media, the Meech Accord & the Attempted Manufacture of
Consent
**** WINTER ************** EJC/REC Vol. 1, No. 2, 1991 ***
THE MEDIA, THE MEECH ACCORD & THE ATTEMPTED MANUFACTURE
OF CONSENT
James Winter
University of Windsor
Abstract. As is their wont, the media turned
the reporting of Meech into a spectator sport. In
the process, they fanned the flames of the
differing nationalist sentiments of French and
English Canada, and played an instrumental role in
the impending fragmentation and breakup of the
country, with the looming prospect of some form of
sovereignty association with Quebec. If, as
appears likely, in the near future Quebec becomes
sovereign with some economic links to Canada, it
will in large part be due to media portrayals and
illusions, such as the Meech accord crisis of
1990. The failure of the Meech accord can in no
way be seen as a rejection of Quebec by English
Canada, which didn't understand the accord
sufficiently to make an informed decision about
it. Thus, Meech was not killed either by Clyde
Wells or Elijah Harper, but by Brian Mulroney's
dock strike negotiating tactics and deceitful
manipulation of the premiers and the public, all
played-out (albeit in the form of a sub-plot) in
the national media.
In propagating the "Clyde Wells did it," or
"Elijah Harper did it" scenarios, and absolving
Mulroney of blame, the media followed their
predilection to oversimplify and misinform,
while simultaneously engaging in historical
engineering for political ends. This is in
keeping with their role as legitimators of state
policy. Thus, despite the failure to manufacture
consent for Meech, the media played their role to
perfection: by portraying the Meech negotiations
as a spectator sport and hence encouraging
disempowerment of the public and discouraging our
involvement; through sensational coverage which
magnified the two solitudes and further serves the
'divide and conquer' aims of transnational
corporate culture; and finally by providing
ostensively innocuous 'infotainment,' which while
attracting large audiences, serves to maintain a
buying mood rather than engendering a serious or
critical perspective.
Thus, the Meech accord debacle constitutes
supportive evidence for Herman and Chomsky's propaganda
model, as it operates on a national level, within the
Canadian context.
LES MEDIAS, L'ACCORD DU LAC MEECH ET LA
PRODUCTION RATEE D'UN CONSENSUS. Selon leur
habitude, les medias ont rapporte les evenements
autour de l'Accord du Lac Meech comme s'il
s'agissait d'un match sportif. Ce faisant, ils
ont attise les flammes des nationalismes
francophones et anglophones et ils ont joue un
role d'instrument dans la fragmentation et la
deconstruction du pays, et ce, alors que la
perspective de la souverainete-association du
Quebec devient de plus en plus reelle. Si, comme
il semble probable dans un proche avenir, le
Quebec devient souverain tout en conservant des
liens economiques avec le Canada, ce sera en
grande partie du aux images et aux illusions
vehiculees par les medias dans des situations
comme celles de l'Accord du Lac Meech. L'echec de
l'Accord du Lac Meech ne peut aucunement etre
interprete comme un rejet du Quebec par la Canada
anglais car ce dernier ne disposait pas d'une
connaissance suffisante pour arriver a une
decision rationnelle. L'Accord du Lac Meech n'a
pas ete tue par Clyde Wells ou Elija Harper mais
par Bryan Mulroney et ses techniques brutales de
negociations, sa manipulation frauduleuse des
premiers ministres et du public, le tout mis en
scene dans les medias nationaux.
En diffusant des scenarios ou Clyde Wells et
Elija Harper etaient les coupables et en absolvant
Bryan Mulroney, les medias ont maintenu leur
tendance habituelle a sur-simplifier et a
desinformer tout en tentant de pratiquer une
gestion de l'histoire a des fins politiques. Ceci
est conforme a leur fonction de legitimation de la
politique de l'Etat. Ainsi, malgre leur echec
dans la production d'un consensus autour du Lac
Meech, les medias ont parfaitement joue leur role
en presentant les negociations comme un sport de
spectacle, en favorisant l'impression de
non-participation et la passivite du public, en
exagerant, par une couverture sensationnaliste,
l'ampleur du phenomene des "deux solitudes" ( et
ceci sert les interets des entreprises
transnationales qui cherchent a diviser pour
regner) et, finalement, en fournissant
explicitement une information-spectacle banale
qui, en attirant des auditoires importants, sert
d'abord a maintenir les intentions d'achat pluttt
qu'a produire une perspective critique. Ainsi, la
defaite de l'Accord du Lac Meech constitue, au
niveau national canadien, une preuve de
l'applicabilite du modele de la propagande de
Herman et Chomsky.
Fragmented and unconnected media content mitigates
against all but the most superficial thought processes.
Rather than concerning themselves with substantive
issues, in reporting on national affairs the media
instead focus almost exclusively on "horse race" aspects
such as: who is in front and by how much, what the
strategies are, and how the strategies might affect the
standings. Even with a crucial Canadian issue such as the
Meech Lake constitutional accord, media content focused
on these elements, presenting a battle between two
opposing sides, with the media supposedly as neutral
observers.
Focusing on the superficial serves numerous
purposes. For example, with our minds 'dwelling in the
shallows' we are more likely to be in a 'buying mood,'
which is virtually the only mood advertisers will pay
for. If programming or news content is critical or even
serious in nature, audiences may apply some of the same
criteria to the ads, whose purpose is to have us
uncritically accept their premises and messages. At a
minimum, serious content may alter our buying mood. To
this end, it is an anathema to advertisers, who largely
only support uncritical, innocuous programming.1 Since
all mainstream content (except on CBC radio) is
advertising-supported, this virtually rules out critical
or even serious material.
Failing to explore issues more deeply2 further
serves to prevent us from realistic comprehension of the
issues themselves or of the interrelatedness of what
might at first hand appear to be unrelated topics. These
can extend from 'unrelated' industrial accidents, or
environmental pollution, which have as their base a
legislative and/or enforcement bias in favour of
corporations as opposed to people and nature, to such
economic topics as: trucking deregulation, the Goods and
Services Tax (GST), the Free Trade Agreement, the Meech
Lake accord, and so forth. All of these may be seen as
integral to a broad neo-conservative agenda which is
pervasive and yet goes virtually unreported in the
mainstream press.3 Each item or event is reported in
superficial isolated fragments which preclude the
development of a cohesive picture, and comprehension
itself.4 While the media can see the spider, they are
unaware of its web.
Additionally and most importantly, mainstream media
coverage, intentionally or not, is enabling. By this I
mean that it serves the purpose of "manufacturing
[public] consent," for policies which are ostensibly in
the "national interest," but which actually serve the
state, including its economic, political and ideological
branches.5
By way of illustration we will look at the June 1990
first ministers' conference in Ottawa, supposedly held to
"save the country from breakup" and to ensure passage of
the 1987 Meech Lake Constitutional accord.
POLITICS AS A SPECTATOR SPORT
If, as Harold Innis indicated, the media are only
capable of reporting adequately on a sporting event, then
it behooves them to turn everything into a game. With a
June 23, 1990 deadline for ratification of Meech, the
meetings were held off until the very last possible
moment. We were already effectively into "overtime."
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and his emissaries such as
Senator Lowell Murray conducted behind the scenes
negotiations, while publicly denouncing the three
"holdout" premiers, Gary Filmon of Manitoba, Clyde Wells
of Newfoundland, and Frank McKenna of New Brunswick, who,
we were told, were "failing to honour the Meech accord,"
signed by predecessor governments. No mention here about
how Mulroney 'failed to honour' legislation by the
previous federal government, including that pertaining to
the Foreign Investment Review Agency, Air Canada, the
Unemployment Insurance Act, federal transfer payments to
the provinces, and so forth.
Meanwhile, dire warnings were made about the
necessity of Meech to the future of the country, all
dutifully relayed by the media, and climaxing with the
resignation of separatist environment minister Lucien
Bouchard from the federal cabinet. Nationalist heart
strings were tugged to the extent that: the money markets
reflected a concern over the breakup of the country and
a loss of faith in the "Northern Peso;" a group of
ministers from Brockville, Ontario, scene of the earlier
Quebec flag-stomping ceremony, travelled to Montreal to
apologize to Quebeckers; after watching a dramatic
overview on CBC TV's The Journal, the mayor and a cit-
izens' group in London, Ont. organized a parade and "link
hands for Canada" day; Globe columnist Jeffrey Simpson
castigated academics and nationalist groups such as the
Council of Canadians, for taking part in the free trade
debate but remaining "curiously quiet" on Meech and "the
possible disintegration of Canada;" a Toronto group,
Friends Within Canada, frustrated with not being able to
express their views and wanting to show Quebec "that we
care," took out $60,000 in ads in an attempt to influence
the first ministers to arrive at a settlement.
Having thus successfully fanned the flames of the
differing nationalist sentiments of English and French
Canada, in the eleventh hour, according to plan, Mulroney
summoned the first ministers to Ottawa, and from Sunday
June 3rd to Saturday June 9th, the nation was subjected
to the spectacle of a live circus, in and around the
National Conference Centre in Ottawa. Mulroney's brand of
brinkmanship applied heat to a constitutional pressure-
cooker, held, appropriately enough, in a converted
railway station. Mulroney, the dismantler of railway
lines and former anti-labour negotiator, brought to bear
all of the old negotiating techniques he learned as a
management lawyer in Quebec, before becoming President of
the Iron Ore Company of Canada. He used a modified
version of the techniques used by the early fur traders
with the Natives, which went: 'Let 'em have all the
firewater they want, then start to negotiate.' In the
modern version, the most successful bargaining is done in
the early hours of the morning, preferably after days of
intense pressure and sleepless nights. If you lock people
up behind closed doors for long enough, eventually, of
course, they'll come to an agreement. It worked in 1987,
why not in 1990? Of course, police are not allowed to use
such techniques to extract confessions from suspected
criminals.
One of the most disturbing elements in all of this
is that while Mulroney assured the premiers and the
country that delays in meeting were a result of the
difficult search for "common ground" among participants,
and he wanted to be assured an agreement could
potentially be reached before meeting, he has since
admitted the meeting was deliberately timed to bring the
impasse down to 11th-hour negotiations.6 More on this
later.
Knowingly or unknowingly in step with the plan, the
national media converged, desperately swooping in to
clutch every available "sound bite" proffered by the
first ministers: either on their way into or out of
meetings, or when they left for a meal or to stretch
their legs. The process became a giant game, with media
experts offering colour commentary, and as we were so
often told, with "the future of the country," all the
marbles, riding on the outcome. Mulroney told the House
of Commons on the eve of negotiations: "What is really at
stake is Canada." The Toronto Star dutifully repeated:
"Canada's future as a nation may be at stake." 7
Likewise, the provinces which were listening to their
constituents, Manitoba and Newfoundland, became
"holdouts" in the press, which adopted the federal lingo.
Why not "democrats" instead?8 What we have here is an
example of the media "underwriting" the state by using
its language. As Ericson et al. note:
The news media, within the prevailing terms of
the state, are a key terrain for the
negotiation of meanings for political
purposes. ..the words chosen are also deeds,
giving preference to particular meanings over
others and ultimately presenting 'evaluative
differences as differences in fact.' (emphasis
in original)9
During negotiations, CBC TV's Don Newman told us
"the game isn't over yet," and we waited. One moment
they were optimistic, hotel reservations were not being
extended and the dollar was up. The next day or perhaps
by nightfall, they were pessimistic, Bourassa refused to
negotiate the "distinct society" clause, Clyde Wells had
been mislead, and the dollar was down.
We had the equivalent of the second round draft
choice, (the second round entry), Team Canada (the Canada
clause, and "Captain Canada" David Peterson), live
spectators and groupies, and gossip from Ontario Premier
David Peterson about the appearance of (cheerleader)
Wendy Mesley of CBC TV. We learned about the "key
players," of course.
With the accord "signed," congratulations all around
served as a signing bonus. The media now turned to "who
won," and Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa was everyone's
choice in English Canada because, Quebec separatists to
the contrary, he stood his ground in the net and didn't
give an inch. "Bourassa got his shutout," The Montreal
Gazette informed us, "the way Patrick Roy defends the
Montreal Canadians' net against opponents' shots."10 In
another article, Terrance Wills of The Gazette told us:
"Alberta Premier Don Getty, former quarterback of the
Edmonton Eskimos, threw the block that won a reprieve for
the Meech Lake constitutional accord." He wrote, "Getty's
block gave Ontario Premier David Peterson time to throw
his long-bomb pass for a touchdown."11 The Windsor Star
referred to a "marathon constitutional wrestling match."
To some, Wells and Filmon were heroes because they
performed well under the excruciating pressure of the
playoffs; to others they were failures as poor "team
players."
It is this type of media coverage which qualifies
for Marshall McLuhan's dictum that "the medium is the
message." Audiences received form and process and
virtually no content. For a week, the drama of the 1990
Meech Cup played itself out before the cameras,
microphones and scribes. Every step was carefully
orchestrated by Brian Mulroney, the erstwhile master
negotiator, and friend and student of Ronald Reagan, the
"great communicator." For their part, the media had the
requisite fodder for the daily news, replete with the
intense drama, the clash of opposing forces, the
colourful personalities, the array of expert witnesses,
and entertainment or 'infotainment' at its best. As Neil
Postman notes:
Television has made entertainment itself the
natural format for the representation of all
experience......Entertainment is the
supraideology of all discourse on
television.12
As a result, viewers are left to assume the appropriate
role for any spectator sport: that of a couch potato,
consuming spectacle and product equally.
BIAS AT THE CBC
We have to ask why it is that the media so readily
played into Mulroney's hands. Oh, there was the usual
hand-wringing to the effect that it was all elitist, it
was only 11 men deciding Canada's fate, the public should
have been consulted, and so forth. There were even a few
echoes of: "We were duped," coming from the media,
especially in light of the strategy document leaked from
the Peterson government, which indicated that indeed, the
media were duped. The Toronto Star reported:
According to the paper, outlining strategy for
a first ministers' conference which is
expected to be called this week, Peterson was
to stick to the high road of preaching
national unity. Meanwhile, Attorney-General
Ian Scott and Ontario constitutional experts
would use the media to fuel the sense of
crisis, undermine the credibility of the
holdouts, and ensure Quebec is not isolated. A
prime target of manipulation was to be CBC
television, which the paper describes as pro-
Meech.13
Even so, this was quickly forgotten and it was on to
the next (sports) extravaganza (in this case the Showdown
at Oka, which itself was a prelude to the Gulf Showdown.)
The media types get their paycheques,14 the advertisers
get their content and happy customers, and the only
losers are democracy, natives, Kurdish refugees, and so
forth.
There are, of course, differing views on all of
this. The Meisel article in this volume is an example.
Another was provided by Trina McQueen, director of CBC TV
news and current affairs. In a Toronto Star article,
McQueen defended the CBC from criticism, and described
viewers as "participating in a democratic experience."
Like Meisel, McQueen argues that the CBC bent over
backwards to provide coverage for opponents of Meech.
"Between January and June, Clyde Wells appeared on The
National and The Journal 69 times..." McQueen wrote. This
was "well ahead of the second most interviewed leader,
Robert Bourassa, who was on 45 times."15
There are two problems with this defense. First, she
fails to compare the really meaningful statistics: what
was the total number of appearances for the pro- side,
vs. the anti- side? Given that the "holdout" premiers
were outnumbered 8 to 3, and later 9 to 2, it's
inconceivable that there was any real balance in
interviews. So, McQueen's statistics were selective.
Second, McQueen evidently subscribes to the outdated view
that: 'any exposure is good exposure,' in just citing the
quantitative. Rather than simply counting the 69
appearances by Clyde Wells, we must look at the treatment
accorded to Wells in those appearances. Barbara Frum of
The Journal, for example, was as hostile to Filmon and
Wells16 as she had been earlier to Pierre Trudeau.
When [Frum] interviewed the week's designated
villains -Premiers Filmon and Wells - she
struck a tone rather different from the one
she took with pro-deal premiers or, later, the
PM. To Filmon: "I wish you'd help me
understand what you just said. I heard you say
it when you came out of the afternoon session.
I don't know what it means." Filmon, who'd
been clear if not profound, stumbled, unsure
whether to repeat himself. "Go on,"
interrupted Frum. "Go on." To Wells: "Premier
Wells, I guess if I sat and pumped the well, I
wouldn't get very much with you."17
I'll return to premier Wells in a moment. First, a look
back at Frum's interview with Trudeau in March of 1990,
with the release of his book, Towards a Just Society, co-
edited with Tom Axworthy. Frum's lead-in to the
interview, written afterwards, said the book's "prime
target...is the Meech Lake accord," although Trudeau
twice had pointed out to her in the interview that only
"four or five pages" in the book dealt with Meech. She
also intoned in her voice-over that the book was "A
savage attack on [Trudeau's] successor, Brian Mulroney."
Having set up her straw man, Frum set about trying to
knock him down.
At one point she interrupted him with, "Let's leave
aside whether life is ever clear. It's only maybe clear
after we're dead." Whatever that means. She then went on
to ask, regarding the Notwithstanding clause, "One
wonders if what you are so upset about is that you,
Pierre Trudeau gave Quebec the very mechanism, the very
instrument to undo your vision?" Trudeau patiently
explained the difference between the Notwithstanding
clause and the Distinct Society clause. Frum shot back,
"I don't see why when you make compromises that's o.k.,
and when the next guy makes compromises that's not o.k."
Next, Frum threw out: "Gordon Robertson, your former
Privy Council chief [who] sees himself as your friend,
says he sees a lot of nits being picked by people who
should know better." Soon afterwards, Trudeau, who had
been a model of patience, became somewhat testy in
response to her goading and blatantly antagonistic
questions, silencing one interruption with "Let me
finish!"
Contrast this with Frum's interview with Ontario
Premier David Peterson, held soon after the Trudeau
interview. Mulroney picked up on a suggestion for
legislative "add-ons" made by New Brunswick premier and
erstwhile "holdout" Frank McKenna. Frum first interviewed
McKenna, who was clearly identified and treated as one of
the 'in crowd.' Then she moved on to two academics and
federal justice minister Kim Campbell. Next came the
smiling Peterson.
"Premier Peterson, my hunch is you've been a big
behind-the-scenes player for weeks and probably months.
Is this a good day for you? Has something changed today?"
Peterson responded, "It's a great day for Canada..."
Verbally cosying up with her questions, Frum went on,
"What role have you been playing with Quebec, because
Premier Bourassa could have been extremely negative
tonight and could have derailed this entirely, couldn't
he? Have you been the go-between?" Lobbing this softball
question allowed Peterson to 'humbly' respond: "I'm just
one of eleven. I'm struggling like the rest of my
colleagues..."
Now comes the bad guy, Wells. Wells had announced
that the Newfoundland legislature would rescind its
previous passing of Meech. Clearly taking the side of the
PM, Frum said: "The Prime Minister has offered you a
bridge to continue the process now of accommodation and
compromise that you spoke about all afternoon when you
announced your rescission move." Wells started to answer,
but Frum interrupted him. "And you say what to that? You
say what? What do you do now?"
Following Well's response, Frum continued to promote
Mulroney's position: "Well, I think [Mulroney] was saying
[that] what happened to Quebec, he will not do to you. He
wants to make you a full partner and I want to know what
your response is to him tonight."
She went on: "Premier Wells, all day today you've
been giving very mixed signals as though you really are
glad to be out of isolation and you are talking as though
you'd like to keep talking. Now what do you want to keep
talking about? Because you've just finished saying you're
not going to pass Meech by June 23 if all your objections
[only] get dealt with later. So what's your compromise
about?" Wells responded that Newfoundlanders can't be
full partners if they're being told to "take it or leave
it." He went on to mention certain "concerns," and Frum
jumped in, interrupting him.
"And you don't think these concerns can be satisfied
with all the freedom you would have to make all your add-
ons? You don't think he's made a commitment to you that
your concerns can be met later? You don't think your
concerns can be met later? Is that what you are saying?"
She concluded, "...I want to make sure I understand. If
this is the deal, is Newfoundland saying 'No' tonight?"
Despite the numbers cited by McQueen, a Journal
appearance is not a Journal appearance.
Obviously this represents only a small 'sample' of
all the interviews on The Journal and CBC TV. But it must
be clear even to the casual observer, that Frum 'went
after' Trudeau, Wells and other Meech opponents in her
interviews. As Salutin notes,
Barbara Frum of The Journal, for all her
professionalism, has never developed the
ability, or perhaps desire, to hide her
biases.18
When it came to the pro-Meech faction, as we saw with
Peterson, the questions were cosy and 'on-side' to the
point where they were really public relations 'lobballs.'
Similarly, while she challenged Trudeau at every
opportunity, as demonstrated above, when it came to her
post-Meech interview with Mulroney, she was positively
fawning. "This must be terribly frustrating," she
intoned, sounding, as Salutin says, for all the world
like his therapist. She failed to challenge his most
outrageous statements ("You had some two per cent of the
population doing [Meech] in"); she set up Mulroney's
attacks on Wells, let him ramble without interruption,
handed him cues, and flattered him.19
As for CBC TV news, it described Wells as,
"emotionally distraught."20 Trina McQueen's defense
notwithstanding, even national news anchor Peter
Mansbridge admitted while the coverage was still going
on, that they had failed.
News is news: it's what happens that day. It's
what's different; it's what's changed. It's
not a backgrounder on constitutional
matters.21
Perhaps even more revealing was his candid
characterization of Meech near the end of January, 1990:
There may be no other issue more
important...the future of the country is at
stake...The prime minister suggests Quebec may
want to separate if Meech dies; some of the
premiers feel the country will disintegrate if
Meech passes.22
From the reported text of his speech, Mansbridge did not
quote Trudeau, or Wells, or any of the anti-Meech people:
only the pro-Meech side. As Andrew Nikiforuk of Equinox
magazine summed it up: "Just when the Canadian people
needed a voice, the CBC passed the microphone to the
prime minister and his dicemen...A co-opted press is
judged by the company or government it keeps."23
Another point that is lost on McQueen in her defense
of the CBC is its admitted use of what Ericson et al.
term, "elite authorized knowers."24 Journalists go where
the power is. They choose to interview those best placed
to provide accounts which have been politically and
bureaucratically authorized.25 Hence, Wells was
interviewed 69 times on CBC TV and The Journal; Bourassa
45 times. For McQueen and the CBC, this constitutes
"balance." In part, this relates to the attempt by the
media to simplify issues, and to obtain 'both sides.'
The notion that there could be more than two sides; that
important and valid perspectives are omitted because
'it's simply too complex,' or the people involved are not
"authorized knowers," appears lost on newsworkers. Thus
women, natives and northerners, for example, were
marginalized in the Meech debate.
THE BOUNDS OF THE EXPRESSIBLE
Perhaps we can better understand the context of this
debate by looking outside of that context to the example
of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Noam Chomsky has
provided extensive reviews on this topic, stretching back
over the past twenty years.26 Chomsky has perfected the
technique of using international examples to highlight
American national problems related to the media, in order
to better overcome the blinders of the propaganda system
he describes. Recently, with professor Edward Herman, he
elaborated a Propaganda Model for the media, which
describes: how media function, how media performance is
discussed and evaluated, and reactions to studies of
media performance.27
Chomsky quotes from The New York Times' analysis of
the debate over the Vietnam War, which stated:
There are those Americans who believe that the
war to preserve a non-Communist, independent
South Vietnam could have been waged
differently. There are other Americans who
believe that a viable, non-Communist South
Vietnam was always a myth...A decade of fierce
polemics has failed to resolve this ongoing
quarrel.28
So, the hawks allege that the U.S. could have won, while
the doves say victory was always beyond their grasp.
What's missing, says Chomsky, is a third position:
"...the United States simply had no legal or moral right
to intervene in the internal affairs of Vietnam in the
first place." The third position exceeds what Chomsky
calls, "The Bounds of the Expressible," and illustrates
the genius of "brainwashing under freedom."
In a totalitarian system, it is required only
that official doctrine be obeyed. In the
democratic systems of thought control, it is
deemed necessary to take over the entire
spectrum of discussion: nothing must remain
thinkable apart from the Party Line. State
propaganda is often not expressed, merely
presupposed as the framework for discussion
among right-minded people. The debate,
therefore, must be between the 'doves' and
'hawks,' the Schlesingers and the Alsops. The
position that the US is engaged in aggression,
and that such aggression is wrong, must remain
unthinkable and unexpressed...29
One could update Chomsky's example by looking at
U.S. press reaction to the failed Panamanian coup in
October 1989, prior to the U.S. invasion of Panama in
December 1989. With the former, discussion consisted
solely of whether U.S. President George Bush was a wimp,
or whether he exercised what The New York Times called
"sensible restraint," in not backing the attempted coup
d'etat on Panamanian "military strongman," General Manuel
Noriega.30 The major fears were that either: the coup
would fail, or the U.S. would wind up simply backing "an
unknown new strongman." These are the reservations which
prevented Bush from eliminating what The Times called,
"the humiliating Noriega problem." Gradually, Bush aides
admitted to "bad handling" of the failed coup, and
members of Congress charged that "confusion among
officials cost the United States an opportunity to
capture" Noriega.31
The author searched in vain through the failed
Panamanian coup coverage in The Times, the newspaper
which Jeffrey Simpson of The Globe has called "the
English-speaking world's best newspaper,"32 to find any
indication of a third argument. Again, the bounds of the
expressible were: the hawks said Bush the wimp should
have provided military support for the coup attempt, the
doves said it was bad timing, it might have failed or not
improved matters (from the U.S. perspective.) We did not
find the position that the U.S. had no legal or moral
right to interfere in Panama. Two months later, with the
above reservations apparently overcome, the U.S. invaded
and overthrew the Noriega government. Noriega himself was
eventually kidnapped and brought to the U.S. to face
American charges. The bounds remain clearly delineated,
and inviolate.
Other examples include: the war in the Persian Gulf,
the U.S. invasion of Grenada (where 6000 U.S. troops
earned 8000 medals), the U.S.-backed Contra war against
Nicaragua, and the bombing of Tripoli.
As with the Free Trade Agreement before it, coverage
of the Meech accord gave short shrift to opponents.
Particularly conspicuous by its absence was the argument
that the decentralizing properties of Meech would mean
the weakening of the Canadian welfare state, moving
Canada inexorable closer to a 'level playing field' with
the U.S. Greater provincial autonomy in the form of the
"opting out" clause, it may be argued, could bring an end
to future national social programs. University of
Manitoba law professor Jack London raised a new danger:
the Meech accord's wording could be used by the provinces
to challenge Ottawa's ability to undertake social
spending of any kind, even when no provincial money is
involved.33 In strengthening the provinces and weakening
the federal role, it can be argued that Meech was meeting
the neo-conservative agenda for lessened federal
opposition to initiatives by multinational corporations,
such as free trade.
In what appears to be "pervasive" coverage of the
Meech Lake meetings and their background in the
mainstream press, we may search in vain for adequate
reporting of these perspectives.34 Generally, no causes,
no patterns may be discerned amidst seemingly random
events. Thus, Jeffrey Simpson of The Globe could write:
Meech Lake, then, is a way-station for a
country in the throes of profound change, the
future direction of which remains unclear.35
For Simpson, thought by some to be the preeminent
political observer in the country, as for the media
generally, "profound change" consists entirely of "Senate
reform, sexual-equality rights, minority-language rights,
aboriginal issues," debated in willy-nilly fashion by
"regions, governments and interest groups [which] jockey
for power," with their "different, and sometimes
contradictory, visions and premises." Although such
machinations occur within a broader context which
includes, "the challenges of free trade, global change,
and the fiscal weakness of the federal government," the
events are unrelated. Simpson's vision is severely
circumscribed.36
It is thus that we become "Meeched-out," without
gaining any real understanding. It's not part of the game
plan.
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
How might the media have contextualized the Meech
accord, aside from the perhaps more cynical view of
Mulroney's machinations? The "differing vision," and
"profound changes" underway in Canada and to which
Jeffrey Simpson and the mainstream media by and large are
oblivious, are part and parcel of the neo-conservative
agenda; Canada's version of Thatcherism and Reaganism. As
mentioned, Meech represents a weakening of the federal
government and the social welfare structure, bringing
Canada more in line with the U.S. model of teeming social
disparity, with all of the accompanying ills. This
despite American rhetoric about a "kinder, gentler"
society. Obviously, this serves the small group featured
on "Entertainment Tonight" and "Lifestyles of the Rich
and Famous," very well. Meech weakens the federal
government, and multinational corporations enjoy dealing
with weak governments. They also enjoy "level playing
fields" such as that brought on by free trade, and the
flexibility to rationalize and move manufacturing
industries to areas where labour is cheap, such as the
Maquiladora sector of northern Mexico.
The Goods and Services Tax (GST) fits in here as
well. Millions of dollars in lost duty revenue resulted
from the Free Trade Agreement, which has to be recovered
somehow: enter the GST. But as well, the FTA has resulted
in a dramatic loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector,
and a consequent (further) shift to a service sector
economy. Because the old Manufacturer's Sales Tax left
large areas of the service sector untaxed, federally,
there is an additional need for the GST, to recover lost
revenues. In this respect it may be said that the FTA
brought about the GST. Finally, the GST fits into the
broader picture of the neo-conservative agenda as it is
a regressive tax, applied equally to people of all
incomes, although following public outcry the Tories have
instituted a temporary income tax rebate for low income
families.
The picture gets broader and more complex as we draw
in deregulation in the trucking industry, which has had
a similar effect to the FTA in the manufacturing sector,
leading to massive layoffs of Canadians and company
closings. These culminated in what may be described as a
general strike by Canadian truckers, blocking entry to
and from the U.S., in the late spring of 1990, just
before the Meech Lake debate heated up. Chronological
juxtaposition of events, however, is no reason for the
mainstream press to relate them in any fashion, blind as
it is to the neo-conservative agenda, which also
includes: axing VIA Rail, changes to the Unemployment
Insurance Act, privatization of the economy, cutbacks to
the CBC, de-regulating the telephone industry, and other
measures.
To return to the question of why the Meech debate
was so constricted, and decontextualized, we again quote
Chomsky:
Democracy permits the voice of the people to
be heard, and it is the task of the
intellectual to ensure that this voice
endorses what far-sighted leaders know to be
the right course. Propaganda is to democracy
what violence is to totalitarianism. The
techniques have been honed to a high art, far
beyond anything that Orwell dreamt of.37
To "intellectual" in this quote, we must add other
elements of the legitimation system, including the mass
media. In their editorial, analytical, news,
entertainment and advertising content, the media stand
foursquare behind what Chomsky has termed, the "national
interest." As such, they are opposed to "special interest
groups" such as: farmers, labour, women, nationalists,
northerners, maritimers, people from the west, youth, the
elderly, minorities, in short, the general population. On
the political right, "the perception is that democracy is
threatened by the organizing efforts" of these groups.
Putting it in plain terms, the general public
must be reduced to its traditional apathy and
obedience, and driven from the arena of
political debate and action, if democracy is
to survive.38
Conspicuous in its absence from the above list is the
group which supported Meech, the FTA, the GST, and other
neo-conservative initiatives: the repository for the
"national interest," otherwise known as big business,
including the consciousness industries (media).
Let's discuss yet another alternate view to that
found, by and large, in the mainstream media. The Meech
accord "crisis" was fabricated by the Mulroney
government, a remarkably effective ruse to enable Brian
Mulroney to obtain his coveted page in the history books
and to "one-up" his hated arch-rival Pierre Trudeau.39
In a front page article The Globe's Susan Delacourt and
Graham Fraser reported on an interview with Mulroney.
Perhaps owing to the immediate post-Meech signing
euphoria, Mulroney brazenly admitted delaying the first
ministers' conference until the last minute. "I told [my
advisers] a month ago when we were going to [meet]. It's
like an election campaign; you count backward. [I said],
'That's the day we're going to roll the dice.'" This
revelation opened Mulroney up to criticism as it
contradicted his earlier position that delay in calling
the conference was due to the difficult search for
"common ground" among the first ministers, rather than
being part of a deliberately planned political strategy.
In this stunning, some would say foolish admission,
Mulroney owned up to having orchestrated the last minute
timing and crisis atmosphere of the meetings, all the
while having told the first ministers and the country the
delay was due to a "lack of common ground." The Globe and
Mail, for its part, after revealing Mulroney's admissions
and precipitating a tremendous furore on June 12,
("Marathon talks were all part of plan, PM says,") had by
June 16 returned to its customary sycophantic position
both editorially, ("It's all in the timing,") and in the
news columns ("PM's method part of tradition").40
Thus, having reported this on June 12, The Globe
backtracked four days later, on June 16, in an editorial
which stated: "Given the inflexible positions adopted by
Manitoba and Newfoundland to the Meech Lake accord, Brian
Mulroney had his reasons for holding off on calling the
recent marathon conference of first ministers..."41
On that same day, Graham Fraser, who unlike
Delacourt is said to have favoured the Meech accord,42
wrote a page 3 article in The Globe which said: "...Mr.
Mulroney behaved like a conciliator, but inevitably a
participant-conciliator." Fraser justified Mulroney's
actions on the basis of the prime minister's belief in
the maxims of the management lawyer in labour
negotiations. We can only assume that the damage control
unit of Mulroney's press office was working overtime, and
succeeded in foisting this particular "spin" on Fraser,
if not Delacourt. "For a veteran of multi-union
negotiations, the context seemed self-evident," Fraser
wrote, in apologizing for the prime minister's behaviour.
"In that context, June 23 represented...a fundamental and
essential deadline."43
The very survival of Mulroney's government and his
political career appeared at stake if the Meech accord
failed. With two Alberta and three former Tory Quebec MPs
sitting as independents already, the failure of Meech
could have meant a dozen or more additional defections,
and an end to his shaky coalition in Quebec. Thus, when
Mulroney said, "What is really at stake is Canada," in
the language of a megalomaniac, he meant that his own
political career was at stake. And he brought all of this
on himself by portraying Meech as a question of whether
English Canada wanted Quebec, and representing critics of
Meech as rejecting French Canada, in what Jeffrey Simpson
of The Globe described as "a months-long process of
bidding up the ante surrounding Meech Lake."44
Although scattered elements of this analysis are to
be found in the coverage, this is not the picture played
up in the mainstream press. After describing Clyde Wells
as a "loose cannon," awash in "indecision," "obstinacy"
and "intractability," The Windsor Star went on to rave
about Mulroney:
the country owes the prime minister a
tremendous debt of gratitude for the uncanny
patience and determination he displayed...If
the accord meets its June 23 ratification
deadline, it will have been the unselfish
leadership that Mulroney exhibited during the
past week that provided the foundation for
success. The prime minister obviously excels
as a shrewd negotiator when brinkmanship is
involved...It was Mulroney who stroked egos
when sensibilities were hurt; it was Mulroney
who downplayed his own contributions and
unabashedly credited others for the roles they
played in reaching Saturday's consensus.45
Others differed in their view of Mulroney's role.
Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells said the final straw was
Mulroney's eleventh hour attempt to get the Supreme Court
to extend the June 23 deadline for Manitoba, but only if
Newfoundland approved the deal. NDP leader Audrey
McLaughlin and Manitoba Liberal leader Sharon Carstairs
promptly called for Mulroney to resign over his role in
the affair.
THE ASSIGNMENT OF BLAME
For his part, Mulroney made an address to the nation
after the expiry of the Meech accord on June 23, a speech
which Carol Goar of The Toronto Star wrote was
characterized by "restraint and dignity," and an "honest
admission of failure." But was it?
Let's take a look at his speech. Beforehand, he had
his Meech point man, Senator Lowell Murray, and External
Affairs Minister Joe Clark, lay the blame squarely on
Clyde Wells' shoulders.
Then in his address, he reaffirmed this, telling us
that "The last remaining hope (for Meech) was dashed by
Newfoundland," which "chose to rescind (its) approval."
The prime minister then went on to blame Pierre
Trudeau, who offered Quebeckers a renewed federalism
after the 1980 referendum, only to have the 1982
Constitution fail to "respond to the expectations
raised."
Mulroney then blamed all those who used Meech as a
"lightening rod for discontent" about budgets, taxes,
free trade, and "linguistic tensions," when the accord
was only designed to "bring Quebec back into the
constitutional family."
Finally, he again by inference blamed Trudeau for
the "failure of the (1982) constitutional amending
procedures," which were responsible for the lack of
public participation and secrecy surrounding the Meech
negotiations.
Thus, the culprits Mulroney identified are: Clyde
Wells, Pierre Trudeau, members of the public unhappy
about Meech, and Pierre Trudeau again.
As for his own role, the prime minister said he
achieved the approval of eight provinces, with 94 percent
of the population, and the approval of the three party
leaders of the ninth province, Manitoba. Unlike the last
time in 1982, he said, "Quebec was never isolated."
Aside from listing his own accomplishments and the
"honest admission" of the failures of others, his major
sentiment was one of disappointment.
"I don't hide from you my great disappointment at
the setback we have suffered today," he said. But he
personally had done nothing wrong. "There is no dishonour
in trying to overcome a serious threat to our unity."
"To govern is to choose. And to lead is to run the
risk of failure. But I would rather have failed, trying
to advance the cause of Canada's unity, than to
have...done nothing." Many now wish he had.
As Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon noted in a far more
statesman-like address afterwards, "There is blame enough
for everyone who was a part of (Meech)...Everybody
involved has to take some responsibility. But now is not
the time to attribute blame or to point fingers..."
Brian Mulroney was wearing out his pointing finger,
and appeared incapable of accepting his considerable
share of responsibility for:
o Delaying a three-year process to the last
possible minute. Meeting in secret with ten
other men, to decide a matter of national
significance via executive federalism.
o Ignoring the concerns of natives, women,
northerners, and the public at large.
o Browbeating the two premiers who tried to
listen to their constituents' concerns.
o Using dock strike negotiating techniques.
o Fanning the flames of national hysteria over
Meech, to exaggerate his own importance.
Interviewed by Barbara Frum on The Journal, Mulroney
held out the Meech document, with Wells' signature.
Ignoring the asterisk beside Wells' name, he said, "This
is his signature. This is the Meech Lake accord...He
cancelled the most fundamental and noble dimension of a
democracy." Moments later, Mulroney said, "I haven't a
word of criticism of him." As Salutin notes, "Frum didn't
even twitch."46
There is a different interpretation of Wells'
actions. Having taken a principled stand on the Meech
accord, approved by the government of his Conservative
predecessor Brian Peckford, Wells was subjected to months
of pressure tactics leading up to Mulroney's grand
finale. In the last week, the pressure intensified. "It's
an unacceptable approach, totally unacceptable," Wells
said of Mulroney's brand of executive federalism. Visibly
upset, Wells finally signed, but with an asterisk beside
his name. His agreement was conditional on the approval
of the Newfoundland legislature. He commented:
I felt so uncomfortable all week. I've been
reluctantly agreeing to compromise against my
stated principles...and what's worse, I have
great difficulty understanding how I could
allow myself to be taken in and kept on that
vortex without being able to get out of it.47
In short, he felt manipulated, as though even as an
insider and participant, his consent was being
manufactured. Next came Mulroney's "rolling the dice"
interview, which exacerbated the problem. "It gives the
impression that we're being manipulated," Wells told The
Globe.
The final straw came when Federal-Provincial
Relations Minister Senator Lowell Murray tried to swing
one final deal with Manitoba: he would go to the Supreme
Court to try to get more time for Manitoba to hold its
public hearings, but only if Newfoundland passed the
accord. Of course, this was seen in Newfoundland as more
pressure tactics. Wells was furious. All along the
dissenting provinces were told that June 23 was the
final, inflexible deadline. No extensions. This was the
final manipulation, and Wells heard about it from the
media rather than Lowell Murray, who hadn't returned
Wells' phone call. In fact, it appeared that Murray went
to the media intentionally, before returning Wells' call,
although this may simply have been a communication
failure.
With this apparent addition of insult to injury, on
Wells' advice the Newfoundland Legislature chose not to
vote on the accord. This scenario makes it quite
difficult to blame Clyde Wells, especially in view of
Elijah Harper's actions in the Manitoba Legislature.
Harper consistently refused the unanimous consent
required to allow the accord to be debated, despite
promises from Mulroney which included a royal commission
into native affairs. The Manitoba chiefs felt Mulroney
was trying to bribe them, and they too felt insulted and
manipulated. Naturally, like Wells they stood on
principle and rejected Mulroney's offers, or attempts at
manipulation, depending on your perspective. In his role
as management negotiator and his seemingly endless
attempts to sweeten the pot to get his way, Mulroney
soured the deal.
Additionally, however, it was unclear that Meech
would even pass the Manitoba legislature, just as it was
unclear what would happen in Newfoundland. Gary Filmon's
Conservative government was in a minority, dependent on
the support of Sharon Carstair's Liberals or Gary Doer's
NDP. This was the reason why both opposition leaders were
in attendance and were consulted during negotiations in
Ottawa.
When Carstairs and Doer were informed of the last-
ditch attempt by Murray and Mulroney to tinker with the
June 23 deadline, they announced that 'all deals were
off,' evidently withdrawing their support for Meech.
Without their support, Filmon would be unable to pass the
accord, even if Elijah Harper had allowed it to go
through. All of the above was reported in the mainstream
media, although at times you had to dig for it, reading
to the last paragraph, or ignoring that which was
emphasized by the media. Enter the revisionists.
The evening the accord collapsed, Mulroney's Meech
point-man Senator Lowell Murray held up the document,
pointed to Wells' signature, and effectively said, 'Wells
did it.' The next day in the Quebec National Assembly,
Premier Robert Bourassa held up the document, pointed to
Wells' signature, and said, "Premier Wells has decided
not to respect his signature." Three days later the
Canadian Press wire service ran a story about the Quebec
PC caucus. Included was a brief paragraph providing
historical background on Meech, which read as follows:
Despite last-minute attempts by Ottawa to save
the deal, it died Friday - one day before the
June 23 deadline - when Premier Clyde Wells
refused to put a resolution to ratify Meech
Lake to a vote in the Newfoundland
legislature.48
Whoever wrote that piece was suffering from
historical amnesia, after only three days - proof that
while the manufacture of consent had fallen short, the
Orwellian rewrite artists were hard at work putting the
correct "spin" on events. They came up with what Chomsky
terms, "...a more satisfactory version of history."49
Missing was any indication of the instrumental role of
Elijah Harper and his aboriginal supporters, or any of
the complexity outlined above. Similarly with The Globe
and Mail, which ran a front page banner headline on June
23 saying "Meech dies as Wells calls off vote." Of course
some note was made of Harper's role. On page 6 a Globe
story was titled, "Harper deals crushing blow to Meech
deal." And on June 29 Globe columnist Jeffrey Simpson
wrote: "The Crees of Manitoba (supported by natives
everywhere) and the government of Newfoundland ultimately
killed the Meech Lake accord..." So, the revisionism
wasn't total. Still, the government emphasis on Wells
eventually played out in media coverage, and became the
"common sense" understanding of Meech, as witnessed by
the CP backgrounder.
The CP backgrounder might have read as follows:
Last-minute attempts by Ottawa to further
manipulate the Manitoba Cree and the
Newfoundland government led to the rejection
of the Meech accord by two out of ten
provinces, whereas unanimous approval was
required.
Of course, dozens of variations are possible, all of
which could be more plausible than the CP version of
'instant history.'
Similarly with the post-Meech Barbara Frum interview
on The Journal, referred to earlier. Here's another
example of the 'hard-hitting' questions she asked
Mulroney:
You really suffered throughout this. But
people saw your face and you looked pretty
grim, pretty dispirited. ...What did that do
to you?50
Why did she not challenge Mulroney, as she had Trudeau
and Wells? Didn't Mulroney's Machiavellian methods and
self-puffery at least warrant some tough questioning?
A QUESTION OF EMPOWERMENT: MULRONEY AND NATIVES
In contrast, not only could you find a differing
perspective in the alternative media, but an explanation
of why Mulroney and others put the blame on Wells.
Writing in Canadian Dimension, for example, Tanya Lester
said "Elijah Harper...ensured the Meech Lake accord's
demise...Harper...used legislative procedural tactics to
defeat the accord." Lester quoted a native spokesperson
who said:
...the prime minister feared he would empower
aboriginals if he acknowledged Harper's major
role in the accord's failure.51
Of course, Mulroney had no wish to empower anyone
other than himself and his allies. Doubtless, recognizing
Harper's role was not advantageous to Mulroney,
especially when he could blame Wells, who is afterall a
friend to Trudeau, Mulroney's arch-rival. Nevertheless,
lest the reader begin to form a picture of pluralist,
competing politicians a la Mulroney and Wells, it should
be stressed that Wells (and Filmon et al.) was and would
have gone along with Meech, despite the personality
clash, except that Mulroney's strongarm tactics proved
too much to bear. The diverse views here have a lot to do
with gamesmanship, and less to do with substantive
differences. If there were such diversity, the 1987 deal
never would have been signed in the first place, and with
or without an asterisk, Wells' signature never would have
found its way onto the 1990 document, in view of the
intense personal differences.
Similarly, the unpopularity of the accord with the
English-speaking public had more to do with form and
process than with substance and content. And herein lies
the real tragedy of the media portrayal of Meech, which
has led the Quebecois to see in its rejection, as
Mulroney promised them, a rejection of Quebec itself. We
will return to this matter momentarily, including a
discussion of the substantive objections to Meech in
English-speaking Canada, such as they were, after one
last point about Elijah Harper.
While Harper, with the approval of the Manitoba
Council of Chiefs, was demonstrating at the Manitoba
Legislature with 5000 supporters, the CP wire was
carrying a story saying Harper had been charged in the
1980s, while a Cabinet minister in the Pawley government,
with refusing to take a breathalyser.52 To my knowledge,
few mainstream media ever have alluded to Mulroney's own
drinking problems, notorious in Ottawa circles.53
However, recently Maclean's columnist Allan Fotheringham,
in a column on the closing of a bar in Montreal's Ritz-
Carleton Hotel, noted that in the past it was one of
Mulroney's favourite haunts. "This was when the present
Prime Minister was in his drinking days, a man who made
an art out of the three-hour lunch,"54 Fotheringham
wrote.
As the days of Mulroney's candid interviews and
braggadocio may be at an end, presuming his handlers keep
him under tighter rein, we may never know to what extent
his personal pique and revenge played a factor in sending
the troops against the natives at Oka, Quebec, in the
late summer of 1990. Amidst reports that he was suffering
from depression and various other rumours following the
demise of Meech, the prime minister was nowhere to be
seen during long periods of this national crisis. Reputed
to be vengeful and possessed of a long memory, Mulroney
possibly may have left the Mohawks of Oka to twist in the
wind in retaliation for the contribution by the Manitoba
Cree to the death of Meech.
Of course, this suggestion is unsubstantiated by any
evidence other than that which is prima facie. Despite
blaming Liberal premier Clyde Wells for Meech's death,
Mulroney did try to negotiate with the Manitoba Cree, and
was rebuffed. With good reason: being principled people,
they were offended by Mulroney's attempt to bribe them in
return for the passage of Meech. From what we know of his
sensitive nature, there is little reason to believe he
would take this lightly. The Oka crisis was an
opportunity to realize revenge on 'natives,' while
appearing to do very little other than responding to
Premier Bourassa's request for troops.
THE DISTINCT SOCIETY CLAUSE
As is pointed out by John Meisel in his article in
this issue, English-speaking Canadians didn't understand
what the Meech accord was all about. As such, it follows
that their objections, and they did disapprove, primarily
were not substantive, but rather emotional. The reasons
for this are doubtless as old as living memory of French-
English relations in the country. In particular, they go
back to Bill 101 and French-only sign laws in Quebec,
with which the English-language media have had a field
day. The fact that the English-speaking minority in
Quebec has held, and continues to hold a privileged
position relative to French-speaking minorities anywhere
in Canada, is absent from English-language media and
discourse. Instead, just as Quebec's negotiating
positions are represented as "demands,"55 in English-
language media, so too is the position of Quebec on
language and culture distorted out of all proportion.
Hence, it's not surprising that English-Canadians have a
distorted view of Quebec, and vice-versa.
While the English-language media have played up the
'thought police' aspect of Quebecois informing on stores
with English-language signs, the Quebec media have
replayed ad nauseam, film footage of a group of seniors
in Brockville, Ont., stomping on the Fleur-de-Lys. In
Ontario, this 'knowledge through media sensationalism'
led, in 1989-90 just as Meech was heating up, to one or
two and then dozens of towns and cities passing municipal
laws declaring themselves to be "officially unilingual."
What towns as diverse as Thunder Bay and Essex Ont. meant
by this is that they were not willing to spend money on
French translations and bilingual capabilities. It didn't
matter that no local monies were being spent, as this was
part of a Provincial program, affecting only designated
communities (which were not the ones declaring themselves
unilingual in the first place!)
In short, it made no sense. It was an emotional
reaction to perceived Quebecois intolerance for the
English language, largely as invented by the Ontario
media. Nonsensical or not, it happened, and in a
snowballing effect, the Quebec media picked up on the
unilingual laws in Ontario as evidence of English-
Canadian intolerance for Quebeckers. This in turn
strengthened Quebec's resolve heading into the Meech
negotiations, which meant that Bourassa was unable,
politically, to make concessions on his five minimal
proposals, including the distinct society clause. This
meant that he was portrayed as inflexible by English-
Canadian media, leading to a stiffening of resolve
against Meech and Quebec.
Combined with Mulroney's machinations, and a growing
personal dislike for Mulroney reflected by his low
standing in the polls, this resulted in an English-
Canadian opposition to Meech which was just about
entirely process-related and media created. But there was
some substance to the criticism, of course. The agonizing
question for Anglophones was whether these shortcomings
could be overlooked in order to please Quebec. Aboriginal
peoples were left out of the process. Northerners were
neither consulted nor pleased. Women's groups were
aggrieved. Nationalists and federalists objected to the
evident weakening of the central government. And the
distinct society clause provided a focus for human rights
advocates.
In March of 1990, in the process of promoting his
new (co-edited) book, Pierre Trudeau took some time to
once again speak out against the Meech accord. His
specific target was the distinct society clause. In an
interview with Barbara Frum on The Journal, described
earlier, Trudeau distinguished between the 'notwithstand-
ing' clause which he allowed to be negotiated into the
Charter of Rights in 1982, and the distinct society
clause. "What does distinct society mean? Can you tell me
what it means?" he asked Frum pointedly, and of course
she couldn't. Trudeau went on to state that while he knew
what he was negotiating in 1982, the distinct society
clause was ambiguous and consequently very troubling.
Since Trudeau still retains a significant following and
considerable respect, this criticism continued to raise
doubts in English Canada.
Toronto lawyer Clayton Ruby, writing prior to the
deadline in June of 1990 in The Globe and Mail, argued
that Quebec's distinct society clause meant it could pass
laws infringing on individual human rights, and which
would be struck down as unconstitutional anywhere else in
Canada.56 Hence, it would give to Quebec that which
English Canada appeared to fear most: permission to
discriminate against its English minority. "Distinct
society" sounded like a euphemism for "special status;"
a notion which made English-speaking Canadians blood
boil.
The dean of law at Queen's University in Kingston
intoned:
...despite the good reasons for the distinct-
society clause, many thoughtful Canadians feel
it should not come at the expense of
fundamental human rights.57
Thus did substance, replete with eminent authorities to
back it up, come to be added to the objections over form
and based on emotions.
Again, Mulroney's patchwork negotiations served only
to exacerbate the problems. His solution was to have a
letter appended to, and referred to, in the Meech
agreement, which was signed by six erstwhile
"constitutional experts." But even on The Globe and Mail
opinion page, this was condemned as a "shabby
innovation," representing "...casual opinions that have
been given a thin veneer of official sanction." The
letter was not adopted by the first ministers, and would
not influence a court decision on interpretation of
"distinct society." It was "simply opportunistic -
designed to undercut criticism."
...the letter's sole purpose must be to
convince those [who are] concerned that
Canadians' rights will be diminished by the
distinct-society clause that they really have
nothing to fear. In this task, it fails
completely.58
The editorial position taken by The Globe the next
day, typically supportive of the Mulroney government, did
little to allay these fears ("The need to recognize
Quebec's distinct society"). It merely stated, "Meech
Lake gives Quebec no licence to savage the rights of its
people."59
CONCLUSION: THE PUBLIC AS VICTORS
To sum up, Anglophone opposition to Meech was
complex, and based on historical and contextual factors.
To begin with, the Meech accord was not killed by either
Clyde Wells or Elijah Harper. Rather, it died owing to
Mulroney's own dock strike negotiating tactics, and
deceitful manipulation of the premiers and the public.
Hence, the failure of the Meech accord can in no way be
seen as a rejection of Quebec by English Canada. Even if
they had rejected it, which they didn't do, English
Canadians simply did not understand the accord well
enough to make a substantive judgement about it.
That is not to say there was no anti-French
sentiment, or there were no substantive objections to
Meech. However, the bigotry which surfaced was largely
related to misunderstanding of other issues, in addition
to Meech. The concern over the distinct society clause
was very evident among those who were well informed,
however it is important to remember that this is not what
killed Meech: it died due to the offensive tactics of a
man reputed to be a master negotiator. Indeed, if it were
represented this way in the Quebec and English-Canadian
media, it would have been much more difficult for
Quebeckers to express umbrage at the rejection of Meech,
given that Mulroney has been seen as an ally in Quebec.
(Certainly in comparison to Trudeau) As such, this
represents a monumental failure on the part of Brian
Mulroney, both tactically and morally. It represents a
condemnation of the backroom negotiating tactics, the
distribution of largesse, the bribery, manipulation and
ultimately the attempted manufacture of consent.
As such, the death of Meech is a victory for the
Canadian people, including the Quebecois, who also have
been subject to attempts to manufacture consent, through
manipulation by and of, the media. This is ironic in view
of the national angst brought on by the release of the
Allaire Report in Quebec, and the inevitable shifting of
the burden of guilt to the victims.60
Like the free trade agreement (FTA) before it, for
whatever reasons, Meech was unpopular outside of Quebec.
The FTA was portrayed and sold as an economic panacea,
but to all appearances is solely benefitting the
"national [corporate] interest." As discussed, past
examples show that the public interest and this
"national" interest are in opposition.
Whereas the Tories managed to get elected in 1988,
and have since implemented the FTA, their attempt to
engineer consent for Meech failed, spoiling a track
record which is as oppressive as it is successful. In
addition to the FTA, the Tories have manufactured at
least tacit consent for: the Goods and Services Tax, the
war on the deficit, the Persian Gulf war, cuts to the
CBC, changes to unemployment insurance, the privatization
of Petro Canada, Air Canada, and other crown
corporations, sending the army into Oka, and much
more.61
As is their wont, the media turned the reporting of
Meech into a spectator sport. In the process, they fanned
the flames of the differing nationalist sentiments of
French and English Canada, and played an instrumental
role in the impending fragmentation and breakup of the
country, with the looming prospect of some form of
sovereignty association with Quebec. If, as appears
likely, in the near future Quebec becomes sovereign with
some economic links to Canada, it will in large part be
due to media portrayals and illusions, such as the Meech
accord crisis of 1990.
In propagating the "Clyde Wells did it," or "Elijah
Harper did it" scenarios, and absolving Mulroney of
blame, the media followed their predilection to
oversimplify and misinform, while simultaneously engaging
in historical engineering for political ends. This is in
keeping with their role as legitimators of state policy.
Thus, despite the failure to manufacture consent for
Meech, the media played their role to perfection: by
portraying the Meech negotiations as a spectator sport
and hence encouraging disempowerment of the public and
discouraging our involvement; through sensational
coverage which magnified the two solitudes and further
serves the 'divide and conquer' aims of transnational
corporate culture; and finally by providing ostensibly
innocuous 'infotainment,' which while attracting large
audiences, serves to maintain a buying mood rather than
engendering a serious or critical perspective.
Thus, the Meech accord debacle constitutes
supportive evidence for Herman and Chomsky's propaganda
model, as it operates on a national level, within the
Canadian context.
Notes
1. As Michael Parenti notes, "Being the people who pay
the bills, advertisers openly regard their influence
over media content as something of a 'right.' Michael
Parenti, Inventing Reality, St. Martin's Press,
N.Y., 1986, p. 48.
2. A candid article in the Report on Business of The
Globe and Mail [Barrie McKenna, "Montreal Gazette
adopts a new format for browsers," January 15, 1990]
describes the trend at Canada's largest newspaper
chain. "The [Gazette's new] quick-scan style, pioneer-
ed by USA Today, is intended to make newspapers
friendly to a generation that gets the bulk of its
news from television." Gazette publisher David Perks
is quoted as saying, The Gazette is "...designed to
take nothing away from the hard-core readers and to
provide easier access to the scanners and the brow-
sers. There is a segment of the population, not just
young people, who don't have a half hour to put into
a newspaper. What we're doing is trying to make
people who scan the paper for five minutes feel like
they're getting their 50 cents' worth." The article
quotes a Toronto media analyst as saying, "All newspap-
rs have to become more like TV to ensure their
future."
3. The broader agenda does still receive some
very limited coverage, which in turn serves the
useful function of maintaining the appearance of
diversity. (For an elaboration of this, see Noam
Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, CBC Enterprises,
Toronto, 1989, p. 48) Having thus "covered" that
angle, the media can go ahead and ignore it in
subsequent stories. The result is that "linking"
between issues might be mentioned in one article or
column, among hundreds on a topic. This encourages the
public to overlook or forget that perspective. Addi-
tionally, a few columnists in the country have
managed to retain both their broad vision and
their jobs: Frances Russell of The Winnipeg Free
Press, and Thomas Walkom of The Toronto Star, come to
mind. Their work serves as an oasis in a mainstream
media desert.
4. In fact, as others have pointed out, media portrayals
actually do serve to provide a "linking" function
between news items; they articulate the prevailing
cultural consensus about the nature of reality,
transmitting a collective identity. In this respect,
they actually "construct cohesion out of the fragmented
'facts of life.'" See Richard Ericson, Pat Baranek and
Janet Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News
Organization, University of Toronto Press, Toronto,
1987, pp. 29-31. In this way, a "commonsense" view of
reality is constructed, but there is a distinct
ideological bias to it.
5. This has been elaborated in the work of Noam Chom-
sky, and in particular in: Edward Herman & Noam
Chomsky, "Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of Mass Media," Pantheon, N.Y., 1988. The
term "Manufacturing Consent" comes from the elitist
philosophy of journalist/political scientist Walter
Lippmann, who argued in its favour. It's important to
note that disagreements do occur between governments
and the press, for example. Usually these are of a
"minor" nature, such as a preference for one
business party over another. Other times, the media
will rebuke the government for not adequately
supporting business. For example, in February of
1991, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Min-
isters on Southern Africa, under the chairmanship of
External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, decided to
maintain sanctions against South Africa until
there is "fundamental and irreversible change" to
the system of apartheid. The ministers are awaiting
action to accompany South African President F.W. de
Klerk's announced intention to repeal the racist Land
Act, Group Areas Act, and Registration Act. News
reports tended to portray the Commonwealth decision
as "perverse and irrational," in keeping with the
corporate desire to return to business as usual. See
Michael Valpy, "There's reason to praise South Africa
decision," The Globe and Mail, February 20, 1990, A11.
6. Susan Delacourt, Graham Fraser, "Marathon talks
were all part of plan, PM says," The Globe and Mail,
June 12, 1990, p.1.
7. Bill Taylor, "World's press give little ink to
Meech," The Toronto Star, June 9, 1990. p. A8.
8. Cf. "Holdouts okay federal plan in breakthrough on
Meech," The Toronto Star, June 9, 1990, p. A9. The
Star also carried a box score countdown to June 23,
with a map of Canada titled: "Meech Lake Countdown,"
and the number of remaining days.
9. Ericson et al., Visualizing Deviance, p. 35.
10. Don MacPherson, "'Goalie' Bourassa enjoys shut-
out in easy victory," The Windsor Star, June 11, 1990,
p.A7.
11. Terrance Wills, "Ex-QB Getty threw game-
winning block," Windsor Star, June 11, 1990 p. A8.
12. Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death, N.Y.,
Viking, 1985, cited in Ericson et al., Visualizing
Deviance, p. 354.
13. "Peterson disavows plan to discredit Meech
holdouts," a Southam News report carried without a
byline in The Toronto Star, May 31, 1990. See also
Chris Hall, "Wells slams 'despicable' plan," The
Ottawa Citizen," May 31, 1990.
14. A revealing article carried in The Report on
Business of The Globe and Mail carried the headline,
"Gulf strife boosts newspaper sales." In the article,
Globe media reporter John Partridge was careful to
point out that "...costs too are soaring," lest we get
the idea anyone profits from war. See John Partridge,
"Gulf strife boosts newspaper sales," The Globe and
Mail, January 26, 1991, p. B1.
15. Trina McQueen, "How the CBC covered Meech
Lake," Toronto Star, July 25, 1990, p. C3.
16. Cf. Rick Salutin, "Brian and the Boys,"
Saturday Night, November 1990, p. 85.
17. Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," p.85.
18. Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," p. 85.
19. Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," p. 87.
20. Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," p. 85.
21. Peter Mansbridge, "Even if its boring, it's
time to pay attention," The Globe and Mail, January
26, 1990, A7. (From a speech at the University of
Calgary.)
22. Mansbridge, "Even if its boring, it's time to pay
attention," p. A7.
23. Andrew Nikiforuk, "How the CBC Handed Mulroney
the Mike," Toronto Star, July 1990.
24. Ericson et al., Visualizing Deviance, pp. 351,
360.
25. Frequently, there is no attempt to balance
such views. Balance is only required to offset
the opinions of "special interest" groups, rather
than government or business. For example, months
after the Oka crisis ended, Quebec Indian Affairs
Minister Thomas Sidden appeared before the hearings
held by the House of Commons aboriginal affairs
committee, and told it that "Mohawk factionalism was
to blame" for the violence at Oka. "Disputes" and
"turmoil" resulted from a traditional "custom"
system established 21 years ago by former Liberal
minister Jean Chretien, Sidden said. "Mr. Sidden said
there was a breakdown in negotiations over the golf
course dispute because the clan mothers had replac-
ed the band council and chief..." the newspaper repor-
ted. The only response to this was from Liberal MP
Ethel Blondin, who pointed out that in recent years
there have been almost as many ministers of Indian
affairs as chiefs in Kanesatake. No attempt was made
to interview George Erasmus or any other native spokes-
persons, to obtain a different perspective. It is
thus that authorized knowers have both privileged and
virtually unchallenged access to the media. See
Graham Fraser, "Native system blamed for violence at
Oka," The Globe and Mail, February 20, 1991, p. A1.
26. For his most recent discussion, see Noam Chomsky,
Necessary Illusions, CBC Enterprises, Toronto, 1989.
27. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media,
Pantheon, N.Y., 1988. For a recent overview of the
propaganda model, see Noam Chomsky, Necessary
Illusions, p.153.
28. Noam Chomsky, "The Carter Administration: Myth and
Reality," in C.P. Otero (Ed), Noam Chomsky's Radical
Priorities, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 2nd Ed., 1981,
p.141.
29. C.P. Otero (Ed), Noam Chomsky's Radical Priorit-
ies, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 2nd Ed., 1981,
pp.299-300.
30. "Sensible Restraint on Panama," The New York
Times, editorial, pg. A30, October 5, 1989.
31. "Bush, Under Fire, Defends Role in Panama Crisis"
The New York Times, October 7, 1989.
32. Jeffrey Simpson, "How the ice cracked," a book
review on The Collapse of Communism, The Globe and
Mail, June 9, 1990, p. C8.
33. For an account of this possibility and London's
ideas, I refer you to one of the few very thoughtful
journalists writing in Canada today, Frances Russell
of The Winnipeg Free Press, "Canadians will pay high
cost for Meech Lake," April 25, 1990, p. 7.
34. As mentioned earlier, two exceptions are Frances
Russell and Thomas Walkom. Cf. Frances Russell, "Big
business bullhorns line up for Mulroney again," The
Winnipeg Free Press, May 12, 1990 p. 21; David Crane,
"Forces unleashed that threaten Canada's future as
strong nation," The Toronto Star, June 16, 1990, p.
D2.
35. Jeffrey Simpson, "More bitterness lies ahead," The
Globe and Mail, June 12, 1990, p. A27.
36. Simpson, "More bitterness lies ahead," p. A27.
37. Noam Chomsky, "1984: Orwell's and Ours," in
Carlos Otero, (Ed) Noam Chomsky's Radical Priorities,
p.302.
38. Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, p. 3.
39. Evidently, I learn from the Meisel article in
this series that CBC TV news Ottawa bureau chief
Elly Alboim independently arrived at a conclusion
similar to this. See Elly Alboim, "Inside the news
story: Meech Lake as viewed by an Ottawa bureau chief"
in Roger Gibbon (Ed.), Meech Lake and Canada: Perspec-
tives From the West, Edmonton, Academic Printing and
Publishing, 1988. After Mulroney's "Roll the dice"
interview, this view became more popular. Cf.
Christopher Young, "PM Fuels Fire for Personal
Gain," The Windsor Star, June 14, 1990, A10.
40. Susan Delacourt, and Graham Fraser, "Marathon
talks were all part of plan, PM says," The Globe and
Mail, June 12, 1990, p. A1; Graham Fraser, "PM's
method part of tradition," The Globe and Mail, June
16, 1990, p. A3; see also the editorial excusing
Mulroney and condemning maverick Tory MP Patrick
Nowlan, "It's all in the timing," The Globe and Mail,
June 16, 1990, p. D6.
41. "It's all in the timing," editorial, The Globe and
Mail, June 16, 1990, p. D6.
42. See the Meisel article in this chapter for this
assertion.
43. Fraser, "PM's method part of tradition," p. A3.
44. Jeffrey Simpson, "Honour, enthusiasm, stripped
from accord after feverish talks," The Globe and Mail,
June 11, 1990, p. A8.
45. "Mulroney's Role," editorial in The Windsor Star,
June 11, 1990, p. A6.
46. Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," p. 86.
47. Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," p. 85.
48. "'War' against Chretien keeps Quebec PC caucus in
the fold," Ottawa CP, Windsor Star, June 26, 1990, p.
A6.
49. Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, p. 33.
50. Salutin, "Brian and the Boys," p. 87.
51. Tanya Lester, "How Manitoba's Aboriginals
Stopped Meech," Canadian Dimension, 24:6, Sept. 1990,
pp. 6-8.
52. In 1987, Harper was Minister of Indian Affairs
in the NDP government of Howard Pawley, when he was
arrested for refusing to take a breathalyser test and
leaving the scene of an accident. He was fined $450,
and quit the cabinet. Two months later, Pawley
reinstated him. Pauline Comeau, "The Man Who Said
No," Canadian Forum, July/August 1990, pp. 10-11.
53. In fact some of the rumours have been dismissed
by the PMO, and derided in the media, including Ot-
tawa's Frank magazine, and The Globe and Mail. Cf.
Charlotte Gray, "Where are those Mulroney rumours
coming from?" The Globe and Mail, May 4, 1991, D1.
54. Allan Fotheringham, "Duck! Here come Brian and
Mordecai," Maclean's, April 22, 1991, p. 68.
55. This is so pervasive that it seems hardly
necessary to provide examples. However, as I write,
the English-language media are reacting to the
Allaire report, the Quebec Liberal Party proposal
on Quebec-Canada relations. The front page banner
headline in The Windsor Star read, "Bourassa demands
new deal - or else." (Jan. 30, 1991, A1, by Peter
Maser, Southam News.)
56. Clayton Ruby, "The Real Losers if Meech Wins," The
Globe and Mail, June 15, 1990, A19.
57. John D. Whyte, "A Shabby Innovation," The Globe
and Mail, June 15, 1990, p. A19.
58. John Whyte, "A Shabby Innovation," p. A19.
59. "The need to recognize Quebec's distinct society,"
editorial, (unsigned) The Globe and Mail, June 16,
1990, p. D6.
60. Chomsky, Necessary Illusions, P. 36.
61. For a good account of the neo-conservative agenda,
see Maude Barlow, Parcel of Rogues, Key Porter
Books, Toronto, 1990, and Joyce Nelson, Sultans of
Sleaze, Between The Lines, Toronto, 1989.
------------------------------------------------------
James Winter is Associate Professor of Communication
at the University of Windsor.
Copyright 1991
Communication Institute for Online Scholarship, Inc.
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