Organizations in Hiding:
|Characteristic and Sample Size||Category||Percent|
|Internet use (n=119)||Regularly throughout the day||68.1|
|Several times per day||23.5|
|Once per day||5.0|
|Once per week||2.5|
|Less than once per week||.8|
|Age (n=118)||Under 25 years||37.3|
|Age 65 or older||5.1|
|Education (n=119)||Some high school||0|
|High school graduate/equivalent)||5.9|
|Some graduate school||3.4|
|Graduate or professional degree||23.5|
|Ethnicity (n=117)||African American||5.1|
|Annual household income (n=113)||Less than $25,000||12.4|
|$25,000 to $49,999||18.6|
|$50,000 to $74,999||24.8|
|$75,000 to $99,999||18.6|
|$100,000 to $149,999||13.3|
|$150,000 or more||12.4|
Hidden organizations. Based on prior research into hidden organizations (Scott, 2013a), 14 organizations representing a broad spectrum of positively- to negatively-valenced organizations were assessed in this research. They are: Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), al-Qaeda, an online anonymous cancer support group, the activist group Anonymous, any men’s bathhouse, a sweatshop secretly manufacturing goods, Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Church of Scientology, Earth First!, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Mafia, Skull and Bones, and U.S. Special Missions units (e.g. SEAL Team 6).
Appropriateness and effectiveness of organizations’ concealment efforts. In the current study, appropriateness was defined for respondents as “how acceptable a behavior is for meeting the expectations of a situation.” Effectiveness was defined for participants as “how well a behavior succeeds in meetings its goals.” When measuring both, we are tapping into the perceived appropriateness and effectiveness rather than some more objective or behavioral measure of what might be considered actual effectiveness/appropriateness. However, for ease of language, we do not place the word “perceived” in front of those terms in most of the paper. Participants evaluated the appropriateness of each of the 14 organizations’ efforts to conceal itself or its members on a single seven point Likert-type scale in which 1= very inappropriate and 7 = very appropriate. They also evaluated the effectiveness of each organization’s efforts to conceal itself or its members on a single seven point Likert-type scale in which 1= very ineffective and 7 = very effective. Furthermore, an “NA” option was provided to the participants, who were told “If you have no answer, put NA.” (Note that unfamiliarity with the organization was not specified as a reason for selecting the NA option.) Although we did not include NA responses, a more detailed analysis of them revealed that the only instance where there were more than 20 NA responses (out of 120) were for five organizations evaluated on the effectiveness of their concealment efforts. Even here, the highest number of NA responses was 27 (for Earth First! and the CIRA). Thus, we think most respondents had enough familiarity to be able to make these assessments (though slightly fewer felt able to judge the effectiveness of their concealment efforts). Additionally another question about favorableness (see endnote 3) that provided a “don’t know” option for each organization, resulted in relatively few such responses.
Appropriateness of motivations for concealment. The appropriateness of motivations for hiding an organization or its members was addressed by a series of ten items, each depicting a motivation for concealment. The motives for concealment considered ranged from concerns for personal safety and/or being open/honest to concerns about embarrassment and/or avoiding responsibility. These motivations were primarily taken from findings of previous research (Marx, 1999; Scott & Rains, 2005), although others that were potentially relevant were added (see Table 3). A single measure of appropriateness was used for each motivation, with 1 = very inappropriate and 7 = very appropriate. The NA option was again provided to the participants.
Attitudes about openness, secrecy and privacy. A three-item scale created for this study was used to measure people’s attitudes towards organizational openness. This scale assessed general attitudes about how much organizations and their members should be open, disclose about themselves and their members, and be transparent. The scale was a seven point Likert-type, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. This organizational openness measure was reliable even with the small number of items (Cronbach’s alpha=.84).
Similarly, a three-item scale created for this study was used to measure people’s attitudes towards organizational secrecy. This scale measured attitudes about organizational rights to privacy, secrecy, and not disclosing about themselves or their members. The scale was a seven point Likert-type scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. This organizational secrecy measure was also reliable despite the limited number of items (Cronbach’s alpha=.79).
A scale of four items, adapted from Dinev and Hart’s (2004) highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=.90) five point Likert-type Internet privacy concerns scale, was used to measure people’s attitudes towards privacy online. This scale focused on concerns about misuse or abuse of information submitted on the Internet. The scale was expanded from five to seven points, where 1 = strong disagreement and 7 = strong agreement. This privacy concerns measure was highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=.92).
We first report efforts to reduce the data by combining measures conceptually and statistically where possible. Once that is done, we use that combined data as appropriate to answer research questions. We use probability values of p < .05 as a guide in noting statistical significance.
The first set of research questions is about the general appropriateness and effectiveness of concealment efforts by various organizations and how they relate to one another. To address these questions, the 14 organizations asked about were reduced to a smaller set of statistically and conceptually similar collectives. First, using the scale midpoint for the appropriateness and effectiveness of concealment efforts, we noted which organizations were high on both dimensions, low on both dimensions, and which were viewed as effective but inappropriate (see Table 2). We also ran principal component factor analyses with varimax and oblimin rotations for both the effectiveness and appropriateness scores (results available from the authors ). Those results clearly suggested several organizations that consistently factored together and had similar means patterns: U.S. Special Missions Units, AA, and an online anonymous cancer support group, which we label support organizations, all work to provide protection and support to those in need; and KKK, Skull and Bones, CIRA, any men’s bathhouse, Mafia, a sweatshop, and al-Qaeda, which we label problem organizations because respondents seem to see all of those as dangerous, violent, or promoting questionable behaviors. Other items only somewhat factored together, but their pattern of means and conceptual similarity suggested a third organizational type: IRS and Earth First!, which we label ambiguous organizations (because respondents seemed somewhat uncertain about how to interpret these organizations that may not be hidden in typical ways). Finally, two organizations that grouped inconsistently across the appropriateness and effectiveness factor analyses were retained as individual items: Scientology and Anonymous. Table 2 lists the organizations in these five groupings.
Paired sample t-tests comparing the five organizational groups on the appropriateness of their concealment efforts reveal that support organizations score higher than all four of the other types. Conversely, problem organizations score lower than all four of the other types on the appropriateness of their concealment efforts. Additionally, ambiguous organizations outscore Scientology and Anonymous, which are not different from one another. As for comparisons between the five organizations on the effectiveness of their concealment efforts, support organizations still score higher than the four other types. Ambiguous organizations and Anonymous (which score similarly on effectiveness) both outscore problem organizations and Scientology (which also score similarly on effectiveness).
As for the relationship between effectiveness and appropriateness within each type of organization, we note both similarities and differences (see Table 2). Concealment efforts by support organizations are viewed as both highly effective and appropriate, and those scores are not statistically different from one another, t(111) = -.17, p = .87. Ambiguous organizations do have somewhat stronger scores for effectiveness as compared to appropriateness, t(107) = -2.30, p = .02. Effectiveness scores for problem organizations, t(111) = -6.81, p < .001, and Scientology, t(97) = -4.07, p < .001, are higher than their appropriateness scores, though still not above the scale midpoint. For Anonymous, effectiveness scores are significantly higher than appropriateness scores and are above the scale midpoint, t(94) = -4.29, p < .001.
Means and Standard Deviations for Concealment Appropriateness and Effectiveness for Various Organizations
|Factors||Means||Std. Dev.||Means||Std. Dev.|
|Online anonymous cancer support group||4.44||2.037||4.65||1.658|
|U.S. Special Missions Unit||5.42||1.955||5.29||1.852|
|Internal Revenue Service||4.11||2.147||4.56||1.638|
|Ku Klux Klan||2.14||1.909||3.70||2.001|
|Skull and Bones||2.58||1.871||3.72||1.872|
|Continuity Irish Republican Army||3.22||1.865||3.90||1.761|
|Any men’s bathhouse||3.25||1.833||3.65||1.712|
|A sweatshop secretly manufacturing goods||2.61||2.030||3.73||1.948|
|Church of Scientology||3.12||1.754||3.99||1.640|
Means and Standard Deviations for Appropriateness of Concealment Motivations
|To avoid retribution/retaliation from others||120||5.01||1.526|
|Because of the discomfort with direct confrontation||119||4.34||1.622|
|To communicate about a sensitive topic||119||5.09||1.432|
|To protect members and their identity||119||5.55||1.351|
|To promote honesty/openness||118||5.05||1.763|
|Because there is no need to be identified by others||115||4.18||1.730|
|For purely recreational/fun purposes||118||3.87||1.842|
|To avoid accountability for actions||120||3.12||2.067|
|To protect the organization or members from legal or other authorities||120||3.78||2.022|
|To avoid embarrassment||120||4.18||1.773|
|Valid N (listwise)||112|
|Note. Individual items and factor mean ranged from 1= very inappropriate to 7= very appropriate|
Correlations reveal several statistically significant relationships between the appropriateness of various motivations and the general appropriateness and effectiveness of concealment efforts by various organizations (see Table 4). The appropriateness of the protection motivation is generally correlated with the appropriateness and effectiveness scores for support organizations, problem organizations, and Anonymous, with those rs ranging from .18 to .33. The prosocial motivation is only correlated with the appropriateness of support organizations, r = .24. The punishment avoidance motivation is positively correlated with the appropriateness of concealment efforts for both problem organizations and Anonymous, with r ranging from .21 to .28. For ambiguous organizations and Scientology, there are no significant correlations involving any of the measures. To further understand these relationships, we regressed each of the organizational concealment appropriateness and effectiveness scores on the three motivations. Before reporting that, we turn to our third question, which includes other variables included in those regressions.
Our third set of research questions asked how attitudes about organizational openness and secrecy as well as online privacy relate to both appropriateness of various motivations for concealment and general appropriateness/effectiveness of concealment efforts by various organizations. Overall, organizational openness (mean = 4.57, SD = 1.36) and organizational secrecy (mean = 4.44, SD = 1.33) are similar and above the scale midpoint (but only moderately correlated, r = .38, and on independent factors). Respondents reported a fairly high concern about privacy online (mean = 5.40, SD = 1.34). As Table 4 reveals, there are several statistically significant correlations involving these attitudinal variables and motivation appropriateness. The more people believe organizations have a right to secrecy, the more appropriate all three motivation appropriateness measures are deemed. Interestingly, the more respondents feel organizations should always be open, the less appropriate they consider concealment efforts actually motivated by a desire to promote honesty/openness. The more people are concerned about their privacy online, the less appropriate they consider any concealment efforts motivated by a desire to avoid accountability and punishment.
Correlations among Appropriateness of Motivations; Concealment Appropriateness and Effectiveness of Various Organizations; and Attitudes Toward Openness, Secrecy, and Privacy
Note. * = significant at p < .05 level. ** = significant at p < .01 level.
Given these relationships, we wanted to see how these general attitudes about organizational openness and secrecy as well as online privacy might compare to the appropriateness of motivations for concealment when trying to predict the appropriateness and effectiveness of concealment efforts by various types of organizations. Thus, we performed a stepwise regression with each of the organizational concealment appropriateness and effectiveness scores as dependent variables. We initially entered the attitudes about openness, secrecy, and privacy into the regression, followed by the three motivation appropriateness items on a second step. In only one case were the general attitudes about openness, secrecy, and privacy predictive by themselves, as they significantly explained the effectiveness of concealment efforts by problem organizations, R2 Adjusted = .07, p = .015. Concern about online privacy was the only statistically significant individual predictor in that model, B = .258, p = .03 (see Table 6).
Stepwise Regression of Motivations for Concealment Strategies and Attitudes (Openness, Secrecy, and Privacy) to Predict Concealment Appropriateness of Various Organizations
|Attitudes about Openness||coeff||-.026||.068||.095||.096||-.136||-.145||-.057||-.123||-.004||.011|
|Attitudes about Secrecy||coeff||.122||.125||.101||.027||.204||.144||.312||.215||.197||.126|
|Attitudes about Privacy||coeff||.109||.027||-.119||-.063||-.033||-.077||-.099||-.114||-.092||-.084|
|Note. *= significant at p < .05 level. **= significant at p < .01 level.|
Stepwise Regression of Motivations for Concealment Strategies and Attitudes (Openness, Secrecy, and Privacy) to Predict Concealment Effectiveness of Various Organizations
|Attitudes about Openness||coeff||.153||.180||.135||.125||.068||.086||.102||.081||.069||.096|
|Attitudes about Secrecy||coeff||.188||.193||.151||.091||.228||.255||.226||.219||.090||.088|
|Attitudes about Privacy||coeff||.112||.035||.140||.199||.258||.143||.180||.049||.147||.104|
|Note. *= significant at p < .05 level. **= significant at p < .01 level.|
For several outcomes, the addition of the three motivation appropriateness scores resulted in a significant regression model (see Tables 5 and 6). For appropriateness of support organizations, R2 Adjusted = .088, p = .004, prosocial (B = .257, p = .02) and punishment avoidance (B = -.252, p = .012) motivations are significant individual predictors. For appropriateness of problem organizations, R2 Adjusted = .13, p = .003, protection motivation (B = .388, p = .002) is the only statistically significant individual predictor. For appropriateness of Anonymous, R2 Adjusted = .106, p = .005, protection (B = .414, p = .025) and punishment avoidance (B = .278, p = .044) motivations are both significant individual predictors. For the effectiveness of problem organizations, R2 Adjusted = .117, p = .03, prosocial. (B = -.263, p = .027) and protection (B= .386, p = .009) motivations are both significant individual predictors. Finally, for the effectiveness of Anonymous, R2 Adjusted = .083, p = .019, prosocial. (B = -.354, p = .03) and protection (B = .568, p = .005) motivations are both significant individual predictors.
The results point to several key conclusions about hidden organizations and their concealment efforts. We first talk about hidden organizations and differences between them. Second, we turn to important findings related to the appropriateness of motivations for hiding.
Hidden organizations and concealment appropriateness/effectiveness. Our results suggest hidden organizations come in several types—and some are rather difficult to classify at all based on the perceptions of outsiders. We find the concealment efforts of some to be judged appropriate, others to be clearly inappropriate, and still yet others to be somewhere in between. Even though assessments of concealment effectiveness vary somewhat less, there is still variation in organizations along this dimension. Beyond the problem organizations (where concealment is very inappropriate and effectiveness is moderate) and supportive organizations (where concealment effectiveness and appropriateness are both relatively strong) are several others that are unclear or seem entirely unique in terms of their concealment appropriateness and effectiveness. Perhaps some of these organizations (e.g., Earth First!) are somewhat unknown and are rated near the scale midpoints as a result. Other organizations (e.g., Anonymous) may evoke a wider range of reactions. At any rate, these assessments represent a different set of classifications than other work on hidden organizations provides (see Scott, 2013a).
Related to that classification, one combination of effectiveness and appropriateness scores we do not find are those organizations whose concealment efforts are viewed as appropriate but ineffective. Such organizations may be rare because they might need to be hidden quite legitimately, but by failing to adequately do so they may encounter problems that threaten the livelihood of the collective and its members. In general, concealment by most organizations we examined was far more effective than appropriate. Even the problem organizations and Scientology, whose effectiveness scores were still somewhat low, scored significantly higher on concealment effectiveness as compared to concealment appropriateness. These organizations may represent some of the most threatening ones because they are reasonably good at concealing themselves even though society may not view such hiding as appropriate.
Motivations for concealment. This study finds three distinct underlying motivations attributed to organizational concealment efforts. Although it is notable that concealment for protection is more appropriate than concealment for more general prosocial purposes, which is in turn more appropriate than hiding one’s identity to avoid punishment, it is the relationships between motivation assessments and the other measures in this study that are most relevant here. With regard to the findings for appropriateness of various motivations overall, four overarching conclusions can be drawn. First, attitudes about organizational openness, secrecy, and online privacy are related to motivation appropriateness. Second, attitudes about organizational openness, secrecy, and online privacy are clearly not as predictive as motivation appropriateness for understanding the effectiveness and appropriateness of organizational concealment efforts. Third, different motives matter for different types of organizations. Finally, motives differ somewhat in their ability to predict appropriateness versus effectiveness of organizational concealment efforts. We explore each of these findings here.
It is not surprising that the more people feel organizations have a need for secrecy the more appropriate they find any motivation for concealment; essentially, being able to hide for any reason is seen as acceptable. We also think it makes sense that people with strong concerns about their online privacy would find concealment to avoid accountability and punishment to be very inappropriate—as they do not want hidden organizations to be able to steal private information and then be able to get away with such actions. By far the most interesting finding regarding the attitudes we examined is that the more respondents feel organizations should always be open, the less appropriate they consider concealment efforts actually motivated by a desire to promote honesty/openness (prosocial motivation). Potentially, people who strongly feel organizations should be open may not find any motivation for concealment to be acceptable. Moreover, hiding in the name of openness may seem especially counter to their views and potentially even deceptive. So, for example, though an organization may state that it uses concealment tools to facilitate open and honest communication, respondents may believe that the organization has more deceptive motives. Further, people who strongly value organizational openness may find too much dissonance in the idea that organizations would conceal themselves to facilitate more open communication.
Despite these findings, attitudes are clearly less predictive than motivations for understanding the appropriateness and effectiveness of concealment efforts. Rarely were attitudes predictive when considered alone; furthermore, when both attitudes and motivations were examined together, none of the three attitudes were significant predictors for any of the ten organizational concealment appropriateness/effectiveness measures. We suspect that people’s general attitudes about issues such as openness, secrecy, and online privacy are simply too far removed from evaluations of specific organizations and the appropriateness and effectiveness of their concealment efforts. A more fruitful path for understanding concealment is to examine attributed motives for that behavior. In general, the findings suggest that the more an individual feels it is appropriate to use concealment for protection purposes, the more appropriate and effective they find concealment efforts by a range of organizations. But looking more closely at the results, we contend that different motives matter for different types of organizations and that motives differ somewhat in their ability to predict appropriateness versus effectiveness of organizational concealment efforts.
To illustrate the suggested pattern, we note that for support organizations, a range of motives are predictive for the appropriateness and effectiveness of their concealment efforts. People view organizations like AA as appropriate in concealing members so they might communicate more freely. A military special missions unit is seen as effective in concealing its covert operations by those who view protection from retaliation as an appropriate motive for concealment. A support organization’s concealment appropriateness is also related to a belief that hiding to avoid punishment is inappropriate. However, a rather different pattern emerges for problem organizations and Anonymous, where the protection motivation is clearly the strongest predictor. Problem organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Mafia, along with Anonymous, are motivated to protect their members because those persons may be involved in questionable activities. Thus, the more someone sees the protection motive as appropriate, the more likely they are to also see problem organizations and Anonymous as generally appropriate and effective in their concealment efforts. Put another way, the less someone sees protection as an acceptable motive, the less likely they are to find problem organizations and Anonymous to be appropriate or effective in their concealment efforts. Somewhat surprisingly, other attributed motives emerged as less relevant here, even though one might assume these organizations would be heavily concerned about avoiding punishment. For ambiguous organizations (IRS and Earth First!) and the Church of Scientology, motives are not predictive of their concealment efforts at all. Organizations like these may be understood by the public in various ways, and perhaps not understood well at all, which leads to assessments of their concealment appropriateness and effectiveness that are ultimately unrelated to more general views about motivations for concealment.
Finally, we observed some differences in which motives predict appropriateness versus effectiveness of organizational concealment efforts. For example, the appropriateness of the prosocial motivation negatively predicts the concealment effectiveness of both problem organizations and Anonymous (but does not negatively predict any concealment appropriateness scores). People who do not view concealment motivated by a desire for open/honest communication to be appropriate may see certain organizations as effective at concealment because they do not see those organizations as ever using such motives; but assessments of the appropriateness of organizational concealment efforts would be less related to what may generally be seen as an acceptable motivation. The appropriateness of the punishment avoidance motivation is only predictive of concealment appropriateness (and never concealment effectiveness). Because punishment avoidance is perhaps the most troubling of the motives we examined, it has clear influences on concealment appropriateness; but even low assessments of the appropriateness of that motivation might not have any influence on the perceived effectiveness of organizational concealment efforts.
The findings presented and conclusions drawn suggest several scholarly implications of this research. First, the research generally confirms earlier models (Scott, 2013a) about the hidden nature of at least the 14 organizations assessed here (most of which are relatively effective in their concealment efforts). However, whereas the previous model classified organizations based on their own strategic efforts to conceal/reveal the identity of the organization and/or its members to various audiences (i.e., a sender perspective), the current research looked at assessments of these hidden organizations by outsiders (i.e., more of a receiver view). This resulted in a different set of groupings that may also be meaningful when it comes to assessing the appropriateness, effectiveness, and general reputation of these collectives.
We also see this work as informing existing scholarship on image management and reputation. As suggested by Allen and Caillouet (1994), research on organizational impression management needs to focus on communicative strategies. We have added to that literature by exploring how strategies of concealment used by organizations are viewed by a more general audience. Additionally, hidden organizations have reputations in the sense that most outsiders have impressions of these organizations, which is consistent with other work arguing that reputation and related issues are relevant for more hidden and/or illegal organizations (see Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Scott, 2013b). These reputations seem to vary both in terms of how positively or negatively the organization is viewed and how consistent such views are across evaluators. Clearly not all hidden organizations have bad reputations—indeed the support organizations are evaluated quite positively overall. However, some organizations (what we generally label problem organizations) do have damaged reputations and others have an ambiguous reputation likely based on the organization’s hidden nature and unclear activities. Reputational research should pay attention to more hidden organizations that have somewhat unique challenges in managing their identity in ways that lead to certain assessments by others.
Additionally, we see this research as contributing to an understanding of organizational communication competence. Jablin and Sias (2001) note that competence can be assessed on multiple levels, including the individual and organizational. Typically, communication competence might be assessed on the appropriateness and effectiveness of an organization’s or an organizational member’s spoken and written communication. We would suggest that work on hidden organizations and concealing forms of communication also demand that we be able to evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of silence and a range of concealment strategies that serve to hide the collective and/or its members.
Finally, we see this work as extending research about anonymity in a couple of important ways. Our findings support the relevance of public assessments and of motivations for concealment, which we think affirms Rains and Scott’s (2007) receiver model of anonymity and other research suggesting motivations for anonymity matter (Scott & Rains, 2005). This work also adds to the small but growing scholarship on anonymity in organizational contexts. It suggests that concealment is essentially a means of achieving some degree of anonymity.
In terms of practical implications, it is important for organizations to understand that underlying motivations are a more predictive measure than attitudes for judging appropriateness and effectiveness of organizational concealment efforts. If an organization can frame its concealment efforts through the use of more acceptable motives, its perceived concealment effectiveness and appropriateness may also increase. For example, problem organizations could—for better or worse—increase the perceived effectiveness of their concealment efforts by projecting an image of protection rather than punishment avoidance when it comes to their reason for hiding. Making that rationale clear to stakeholders can affect the organization’s reputation (Scott, 2013b). As another practical implication, citizens and policy makers should recognize that not all hidden organizations are problematic. They vary—in part based on the motivations we may ascribe to them for their concealment.
Several limitations of this exploratory research should be addressed in future scholarship. For example, even though participants in this study comprise a fairly diverse set of individuals, this was not a random, national/global sample and therefore the study’s generalizability is limited. Also, we relied on a questionnaire focused on public assessments of the appropriateness and effectiveness of concealment efforts--rather than asking organizations and their members more directly about their concealment or interviewing people to better understand why some of the observed relationships might have emerged. Connected to this, we are limited with this data to relating perceptions to other perceptions. Additionally, even though respondents clearly were able to make assessments about these organizations in most instances, a more direct measure of exactly how knowledgeable they were about each organization may have been useful.
To address some of these concerns, future research should incorporate additional methods that produce other forms of data. For example, more qualitative research may help us to better understand some results that seem more counter-intuitive by allowing researchers to explore those findings in more detail. As another possibility, experimental studies could allow for the manipulation of motivations to assess their influence on levels of concealment appropriateness and effectiveness. Research might also be focused on understanding how one’s profession or occupation can define their understanding of appropriateness and effectiveness of concealment technologies.
Despite the attention we continue to give to more visible organizations, we live in an era where a variety of hidden organizations can be found in the organizational landscape. Given the importance of those collectives, it is vital that we better understand the nature of organizational concealment efforts. We believe evaluating how people assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of organizational concealment efforts and the motivations for concealment represents a useful starting point for pulling back the curtain a bit on these organizations in hiding.
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 It is possible that the use of several paired t-tests create some Type 1 error here, but p values are generally so small that corrective efforts to reduce the significance level would not have substantively changed the results.
 We also measured favorableness scores for these hidden organizations, which correlated strongly with the appropriateness of their concealment efforts. As a result, we did not report those findings or have a need to control for that in this research.
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