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Strategies
and Tactics The notion of strategies and tactics
originated from game
theory. Game theory was
developed to study war and
deterrence. Some of the assumptions of game theory (particularly, the
idea that parties are aware of the other's goals and will act
rationally) make the theory less useful in the interpersonal conflict
arena. Still, the notion that individuals choose among a variety of
behavioral strategies and tactics remains useful. Behind the study of conflict strategy
and tactics is the hope that individuals who are aware of many options
will make better choices in conflicts than those who feel they have no
choices or very limited options. The first strategic choice in a
conflict is whether to avoid or engage. The avoidance behaviors discussed
elsewhere can be viewed as
avoidance tactics. If a strategic choice is made to
engage in conflict, then tactics or moves must be selected. Competitive
tactics include personal criticism; rejection, hostile requests, jokes,
threats and questions; sarcasm; making statements which attribute
thoughts or motives to the other party; denial of responsibility; verbal
aggressiveness; refusing to disclose one's interests; remaining
positional; and obnoxiousness. Collaborative or mutual gains
tactics include focusing on interests; problem-orientation; appealing to
fairness; being descriptive; disclosing one's own goals and needs;
soliciting information from the other person in the conflict; making
concessions; accepting responsibility; and offering face-saving options.
A comprehensive explanation of
tactics is beyond the scope of this introductory discussion. A separate
body of literature exists to discuss the tactical moves in traditional
or competitive negotiation and in mutual gains bargaining. Keep in mind,
however, that understanding and obtaining a wide repertoire of tactical
options gives conflict managers more choices and a greater feeling of
personal competence. Sources for the strategies and
tactics variable discussion include Fisher and Brown,
1988; Folger,
Poole, and Stutman, 1997; Hall, 1993;
Johnson, 1993; Lax and
Sebenius, 1986; Lulofs, 1994; Schelling,
1960; Susskind and Field, 1996; Wilmot
and Hocker, 1998.
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